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Abstract. In telecommunication networks, the user attribution problem refers to the challenge faced in 
recognizing communication traffic as belonging to a given user when information needed to identify the user 
is missing. This problem becomes more difficult to tackle as users move across many mobile networks 
(complex networks) owned and operated by different providers. The traditional approach of using the source 
IP address as a tracking identifier does not work when used to identify mobile users.  Recent efforts to 
address this problem by exclusively relying on web browsing behavior to identify users, brought to light the 
challenges of solutions which try to link up multiple user sessions together when these approaches rely 
exclusively on the frequency of web sites visited by the user. This study has tackled this problem by utilizing 
behavior based identification while accounting for time and the sequential order of web visits by a user.  
Hierarchical Temporal Memories (HTM) were used to classify historical navigational patterns for different 
users. This approach enables linking multiple user sessions together forgoing the need for a tracking 
identifier such as the source IP address.  Results are promising. HTMs outperform traditional Markov chains 
based approaches and can provide high levels of identification accuracy. 
 
Keywords. Accuracy Scalability, Attribution, Complex Networks, Mobile Networks, Concept Drift 
Introduction 
The internet of people is becoming the internet of things and it is going to 
be mobile. Communication devices attached to gas meters, vending machines, 
fleets of trucks, payment kiosks, as well as, android phones enabled as WIFI 
routers, ipads, and iphones, all seek, sometimes without requiring human 
control, persistent connectivity to different resources via complex networks.  In 
this new and dynamically evolving environment it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to identify these devices and their users. 
Complex networks represent graphs with patterns of connectivity that are 
neither purely regular nor purely random but instead follow a particular 
mathematical function, known as the power law where these graphs expand 
continuously with the addition of new vertices and new vertices tend to attach 
preferentially to other vertices that are already well connected. The hyperlink 
connectivity of documents in the World Wide Web, the pattern of connectivity 
of users accessing web documents on the web, the nodes that connect the 
internet as well as mobile networks that attach to the internet from multiple 
locations all share the properties of complex networks. 
Traditionally, users are identified via authentication techniques which 
verify the legitimacy of either the user or the device accessing that network. 
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Once properly authenticated the user/device can access the resources of that 
network and potentially other networks for which the user had not been 
authenticated. As mobility is becoming pervasive, users continually move 
across secured and unsecured networks to access resources available across the 
internet. A key question that this study has addressed is: “How can users be 
identified when accessing resources across complex networks when no 
authentication information is available? The answer to this question has 
important implications to identification of malicious users re-entering the 
network. In particular, the traditional user identification problem which 
leverages authentication to recognize users, morphs into a user attribution 
problem when user authentication is not possible. In 2010 Clark and Landau 
[12] acknowledged the need for stronger forms of personal identification that 
can be observed in the network and defined the attribution problem in terms of 
a question: “Why don’t packets have license plates?”.  Addressing user 
attribution allows users to be recognized among many by attributing a trace of 
past user activity to a given user. 
While the academic community has recognized this problem and its 
complexity, few solutions have been proposed and none address the user 
attribution problem that ensues when users move across complex networks 
driven by mobility scenarios that have become a mainstream of personal 
computing. User identification and user attribution have been addressed in the 
context of web usage mining [13, 33, 37, 21, 3, 41] but solutions are strongly 
coupled with the web page structure of specific web sites and cannot be applied 
in their current form to the more generic user identification problem across 
multiple web sites accessed via complex networks. More recently “re-
identification” has been proposed as an approach, used in dynamic networks 
like telecommunication networks and the internet, which turns the user 
identification problem into a matching problem that involves comparing the 
behavior of network entities such as users across time periods [27].  The re-
identification approach has been successfully applied to email-alias detection, 
author attribution [26] and identification of fraudulent consumers in 
telecommunication networks, but never in the context of complex networks as 
defined in this work. 
This study makes a contribution to the field of computer information 
systems by tackling the highly relevant and current problem of user attribution 
by evaluating the impact of the power law distribution and concept drift present 
in complex networks. The proposed research has made use of hierarchical 
temporal memories to record and classify historical user activity in the form of 
unique time ordered user web site visits. This classification ensures that future 
user attributions are based on identification of unique patterns of activity that 
match prior activity patterns by a given user. Hierarchical temporal memories 
represent a new advance in our understanding of how the neocortex part of a 
human brain learns and infers sequence patterns over time. 
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1. The Problem 
This research has addressed the challenge that no effective method exists 
that can recognize the source of communication entering the network or 
returning to a web site by only utilizing the communication traffic of the user. 
This problem is further exasperated by the fact that often no form of explicit 
(user name/password) or implicit (cookies) authentication is available to 
identify the source of communication.  When user authentication is not 
available, users with their communication traffic can no longer be identified, 
instead, users can be recognized based on past user activities and the user 
identification problem can be restated as a user attribution problem. 
In order to better appreciate the severity of this problem, consider a 
malicious user that has been authenticated by an operator network and then 
proceeds to hack multiple web servers hosted outside the operator network. 
Imagine then, that this user continues to perform malicious activity while 
moving between secured and unsecured networks. How can this user be 
recognized and stopped? Authentication does not help to identify malicious 
authenticated users if the attack occurs away from the authentication point. In 
addition, a malicious user can hide his tracks and renew his authentication 
credentials by switching periodically between network operators. If user 
authentication cannot effectively be used to identify users re-entering the 
network then what new approach should be used? 
Identification of the source of communication traffic has traditionally relied 
on the IP address associated with the source of the connection, utilizing it as 
the client or user identifier. This client identification technique has been used to 
enforce access-control decisions but suffers from several shortcomings that can 
potentially make it ineffective [10]:  
 A portion of IP addresses are dynamically assigned to clients upon 
initial connection to the network.  
 A portion of IP addresses are allocated behind Network Address 
Translation (NAT) boxes which hide the real IP address (typically a 
private IP address) of the client.  
 A portion of IP addresses go through web proxies which cause the 
client IP address to be replaced by a new public IP address  
A large number of IP traceback techniques have been proposed to identify 
the source of communication traffic in the literature as reported by [42, 9, 43, 
11, 45]. As pointed out by Santhanam et al [42], most IP traceback schemes are 
only capable of tracing up to stepping stones (compromised server) which in 
the context of complex networks, are similar to NATs and Web Proxies in that 
they assign the source IP address and represent one end point of the 
communication, thus hiding the real IP address of the user. In addition, 
individual organizations would find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
successfully utilize IP tracebacks without the involvement of the upstream 
internet service provider [6]. 
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As described, traditional security methods that utilize “IP trace back” 
techniques fail to identify the source of communication associated with users 
that operate in complex networks (like cellular operator networks) due to the 
deployment of large cellular gateways that control the source of 
communication (source IP addresses) for millions of users. Specifically, 
identification of the source of communication is complicated by the dynamic 
assignment of source IP addresses to users by these gateways as well as by the 
presence of large scale NAT and web proxy devices in operator networks. It is 
difficult to determine how long IP addresses remain allocated to a given user 
since IP addresses allocated by cellular gateways, out of very large IP pools, 
persist for longer time periods based on operator configuration (up to 24 hours) 
than IP addresses modified by NATs or web proxy devices, which are allocated 
out of much smaller ranges of IP addresses and change very often, typically for 
the duration of a TCP connection. 
1.1. Research Questions 
These are the research questions that have provided the original motivation 
for this study:  
 Is it possible to recognize specific users among many in the network by 
observing and classifying their historical communication behavior and 
be at least as accurate in the classification process measured using 
recall as when leveraging comparable classification approaches?  
 Does accuracy scale? That is, can the solution maintain the same level 
of accuracy, as the communication population (number of sources and 
number of destinations contacted by these sources) increases? 
1.2. Assumptions 
Two assumptions were made for this study:  
(1) HTTP (port 80) traffic was selected as the most representative user 
communication type traffic since it is used by web browsers which 
require direct user intervention to navigate. An implication of this 
study is that it will not be possible to separate any traffic initiated 
by applications which do not require user intervention/direction but 
still utilize port 80.  
(2) This study assumes that a user uses a single non shared device for 
all experiments. 
1.3. Related Work 
The popularity of wireless devices and the rise in supported bandwidth by 
WiFi and cellular 4G networks has brought to the forefront the user attribution 
problem in the context of mobility scenarios. Between 2009 and 2013 several 
researchers have tackled this problem. Two generic frequency based 
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approaches have emerged from this work. One leverages source IP address 
based identification to track users and uses frequency of access to visited web 
destinations to perform inference. Results from this approach are good in terms 
of accuracy and scalability but accuracy decreases dramatically when the 
source IP changes. The other approach leverages behavior-based identification 
which forgoes tracking via the use of a source IP address and only uses 
frequency of access to visited web destinations. Results are promising in terms 
of recall accuracy but accuracy does not scale well since frequency of visited 
web sites does not provide enough unique differentiation among different users 
especially when few popular web sites dominate test data sets. 
In 2009 Kumpošt and Matyáš [32] took on the user attribution 
problem by leveraging vectors of destination IP addresses bound to specific 
source IP addresses and classified users based on similarity between train and 
test data measured using TF-IDF. Experiments results are mixed showing 21% 
false alarms for SSH, and false alarm rates of 70% and 60% for HTTP and 
HTTPS. The authors blame the poor results on students moving across campus 
and getting assigned different IP addresses. In 2010 Herrmann, Gerber, Banse 
and Federrath [24] use behavior-based identification to tackle the user 
attribution problem so that users are identified based on access frequencies of 
web destinations within a fixed user time window which satisfies classification 
based on a Multinomial Naïve Bayes (MNB) classifier.  Experiment results 
show correct user identification for 50% of the 28 users 80% of the time. 
Assumption of conditional independence among sites visited limits the 
scalability of this solution. In 2010, Yang [46] also proposed behavior-based 
identification. During inference, support and lift are computed to record the 
strength of patterns of visited web sites followed by calculating the Euclidian 
difference between learned user patterns and newly inferred ones. Experiment 
results show 87% accuracy for 100 users using the support based inference. 
However, the author acknowledges the difficulty of scaling up the number of 
users due to the inability of the approach to link up consecutive user sessions 
belonging to the same user. In order to address the scalability problem Yang 
suggests, as future research, combining behavior-based identification with the 
use of a tracking identifier like a source IP address. In 2012, Banse, Herrmann, 
and  Federrath  [4] use the triplet <epoch, source IP, destination IP> to identify 
user sessions by aggregating all events that share that same epoch (time frame) 
and source IP based on a Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifier. Experiment 
results show correct user identification for 88% of about 2100 user sessions. 
The authors also acknowledge that changing the source IP address frequently 
decreases accuracy (60% every 3 hours, 49% every hour). In 2013, Hermann, 
Banse and  Federrath  [25] use again the triplet <epoch, source IP, destination 
IP> to identify user sessions by aggregating all events that share that same 
epoch (time frame) with a source IP based on a comparison of three 
classification approaches: 1) 1-Nearest Neighbor Classifier using Jaccard 
coefficient and Cosine Similarity), 2)  Multinomial Naïve Bayes and 3) using 
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lift and support as proposed in Yang [46]. The best accuracy results record up 
to 85% recall, using MNB, for over 3000 users with the IP address changing 
every 24 hrs. Recall accuracy degrades when the source IP address changes 
frequently (65% every 3 hours, 54% every hour). In Yang's study, behavioral 
profiling was meant to be used as an additional authentication mechanism (like 
a behavioral biometric). Therefore, Yang could assume that the learning 
algorithms will have access to a quite large set of labeled sessions for each user. 
In fact, the cited result of 87% recall for 100 concurrent users was achieved 
with 200 training sessions per user (to derive the support-based patterns for the 
profiles) and 100 test sessions, which were processed as a whole to obtain the 
support-based profiles, which were to be linked to the training sessions. In 
contrast, the work by Herrmann et al. [25] links singular sessions. 
 
Previous research on web mining [21, 37, 41] shows that utilizing the 
source IP is a poor choice for identifying users when the source IP address 
changes as is the case in mobility scenarios. Previous research also shows that 
utilizing exclusively behavior based identification does not scale well. To 
understand why consider using the approach proposed in the literature to 
identify users that visit 3 popular web sites, say A, B, C.  In this case, there 
exists a single identifiable pattern <A, B, C> distinguishable only based on the 
user frequency of access of each web site. Now consider recording the order of 
visits to web sites as an additional way to classify unique patterns. This 
approach would increase six fold the number of unique patterns :<ABC>, 
<ACB>, <CAB>,<CBA>,<BAC>,<BCA>.  Finally, consider taking into 
account the time when web sites are visited so that sites visited at 
approximately the same time represent a single user timed sequence. Now the 
number of unique patterns increases even more: <ABC>, <ACB>, 
<CAB>,<CBA>,<BAC>,<BCA>,<A>,<B>,<C>,<AB>,<BC>,<AC>,<CB>, 
<CA>,<BA>. Increasing the number of unique identifiable patterns helps 
address the presence of popular web sites in the data set creating conditions for 
unique differentiation among user patterns that enables to adequately address 
the user attribution problem. 
2. The Approach 
The use of timed sequences is at the heart of the approach used in this 
study to address the user attribution problem. Specifically, variable order 
Markov chains are used to represent time ordered sequences of web 
destinations visited by users. States in the Markov chain represent web sites 
visited and transitions between states represent frequency of visits. 
Unfortunately, challenges do exist when utilizing traditional Markov chains: 
(1) Higher Order Markov Chains increase accuracy but decrease coverage [15]. 
(2) Markov chains incorrectly recognize never learned before sequences [14]. 
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When using Markov chains it is difficult to match many different 
sequences (high coverage) accurately. The challenge lies in how input 
sequences are matched against learned input within Markov chains. The 
learned sequence within a Markov chain matched against the input is known as 
“context”. The most flexible type of Markov chain is the variable order 
Markov chain where the order (length) of the context is allowed to vary. 
Variable order Markov chains like PPM-C [35] and All-K [38] attempt to 
match exactly the input sequence against a context of size N (where N 
represents the order of the Markov chain). If a match is not found then the input 
sequence is matched against a shorter context of size N-1, and onward 
decreasing the size of the learned sequence in the Markov chain until a match is 
found or a mismatch is declared. In 2004, Deshpande and Karypis [15] have 
shown that matching a size N context increases accuracy but decreases 
coverage (few sequences are identified accurately), while decreasing the size of 
N upon mismatches increases coverage but decreases accuracy (many 
sequences identified with lower accuracy). Ultimately it is desirable to achieve 
both high accuracy and high coverage.  
In this study, Markov chain accuracy will be improved using a technique 
known as state cloning [14] and further extended with a technique known as 
“Sequence Cloning” introduced for the first time in this study. Consider the 
Markov chain shown in Fig. 1 created with sequences abd and xbc. Note that 
this Markov chain will recognize and generate one of the following four 
sequences: abd, abc, xbd or xbc, where sequences abc and xbd were never 
learned. 
 
Figure 1 Loss of accuracy in Markov chain 
 
The problem lies with shared state “b” which has the property that its in-
degree and out-degree are both greater than 1. When this occurs, the Markov 
chain will identify more sequences than were learned. To address this problem 
state cloning (duplicating the shared state) is traditionally used to address the 
issue as shown in Fig. 2.  
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Figure 2 State Cloning  
 
However, traditional state cloning is not always sufficient to address 
situations were multiple states are shared as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 Limitations of State Cloning 
 
The Markov chain in Fig.3 originally learned sequences <5, 1, 2, 3> and <1, 
2, 3, 4> yet two more sequences are identified. Note that the single node 
cloning conditions are not violated, yet this graph produces two sequences that 
were never learned: 1, 2, 3 and 5, 1, 2, 3, 4. In this case, the problem occurs at 
the transitions covered by points a and b. These transitions allow the generation 
through shared nodes 1 and 3 of more than 2 sequences. Namely:  <1, 2, 3, 4>, 
<1,2,3>, <5,1,2,3>, <5,1,2,3,4>. To address this problem the state cloning 
approach is extended to cover sequences of shared states such that sequence 
cloning is needed when the first shared node in a sequence of shared nodes has 
an in-degree greater than 1 and the last shared node in a sequence of shared 
nodes has an out-degree also greater than 1. By duplicating all shared states we 
solve the problem as shown in Fig. 4. Note that both state and sequence cloning 
increase accuracy but also increase the number of nodes in a Markov chain. 
This study introduces the idea of accurately matching a learned timed 
sequence (context) loosely not necessarily exactly using a combination of 
longest common subsequence and longest common substring calculations 
instead of matching “exactly” the context of learned sequences stored in 
variable order Markov chains. 
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Figure 4 Sequence Cloning 
 
While use of timed sequences of visited web destinations allows increasing 
the discriminating power of the solution, there still is a need to link up multiple 
user sessions (sequences) in order to address the poor scalability problem faced 
by behavioral based identification techniques that forgo the use of a tracking 
identifier like the source IP address. In this study, hierarchical temporal 
memories (HTMs) are used to address this need.  
A Hierarchical Temporal Memory (HTM) is a technology that is modeled 
on the algorithms used in the neocortex of the brain [19, 23].  Network nodes in 
an HTM, are organized in a hierarchical way, with each node implementing 
learning and memory functions.  Hierarchical Temporal Memories are an 
appropriate tool to study complex networks. HTMs perform well when the data 
they process support a hierarchical structure.  Ravasz and Barabasi [40] show 
that the scale free and high degree of clustering of complex networks like the 
World Wide Web are the consequence of a hierarchical organization. They 
show that a small group of nodes, such as communities of interest in the WWW, 
organize in a hierarchical manner forming larger groups, while still maintaining 
a scale free topology. This self-similar nesting of different groups into other 
groups forces a hierarchical structure that well fits the ability of HTMs to 
correlate groups that are close in space and time. For more information on why 
HTMs were chosen to deal with complex networks see Appendix G. 
 
2.1. HTM Inputs 
The next few sections will introduce many terms, computations and 
symbols which are defined in Appendix I. Figure 7 shows a typical HTM with 
its inputs. Input sequence (IS) is the input sequence being matched by a given 
HTM layer. For HTM layer 1, IS is a sequence of web destinations (in a real 
cellular network these are extracted from HTTP requests) and for HTM layers 
2 and 3 it is a sequence of temporal groups (variable order Markov chains) 
matched in the layer below. At layer 1, input is of the form: Timestamp<TS, 
Dest> where the format of this input is fully described in the “Session 
Identification” section.  
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At HTM layers 2 and 3 input is of the form: λ𝐿𝑥 < 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝑔𝑖 
, 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝑔𝑖+1,𝐹𝐹𝐵𝑔𝑖+2,… > where 2 ≤  x ≤  3 represent layers above the first HTM 
layer and 1 ≤  i  ≤  the number of Markov Chains at HTM layer Lx-1. λ𝐿𝑥 is a 
vector of feed forward beliefs, which measures how well inputs match learned 
sequences and is a vector where only one index is filled based on which 
temporal group gi  matched the input at the lower layer Lx-1 of the HTM. The  
λ𝐿𝑥 vector represents the input for HTM layers 2 and 3 where the index of the 
entry in the vector that is filled represents the feed forward belief of the specific 
temporal group gi is received from lower HTM layers. For instance, vectors 
λ𝐿2<0, 0.4, 0> and λ𝐿2<0.8, 0, 0>, show layer 2 of the HTM receiving from 
layer 1 a sequence of temporal groups 𝑆𝑔21(g2, g1) with feed forward belief 
values of 40% and 80%  for temporal groups 2 and 1 respectively.  
2.1.1. Session Identification  
In this study, the TCP timestamp TS value [29] is used to identify and track 
user sessions only during the training phase of experiments. The use of TCP 
timestamps was inspired by the work of Kohno, Broido and Claffy [30]. These 
authors proposed device recognition by fingerprinting devices via detection of 
changes in clock skews among different devices using the TCP Timestamp 
option. Kohno et al., believe that their approach can be used to identify the 
same physical device among a large number of devices since there exist 
variability in the clock skew of different physical devices, and it holds that the 
clock skew for a given device is constant and independent of network access 
technology. This approach differs from the way in which TCP timestamps are 
used in this study, where they are leveraged to track directly user sessions and 
consider clock skew not as a unique fingerprint for devices but instead noise 
that will decrease the tracking capabilities of this session identification  
approach. In general, any fingerprinting approach which identifies a logical 
source (e.g. source IP address) or a physical device as done in Kohno et al. 
suffers in deployments which obfuscate the source. This becomes particularly 
problematic in session identification when trying to link up TCP packets 
belonging to the same user. Consider fingerprinting a device as proposed in 
Kohno et al. which requires the TCP timestamp value to be passed unchanged 
through a middle box. Many middle boxes deployed in cellular networks act as 
“proxies” by splitting the TCP connection between the device and the origin 
server into two separate TCP connections which cause the origin server to 
negotiate TCP timestamp options with the middle box instead of the device 
[28]. This causes the middle box to be mistaken for the real source. This is not 
a problem when TCP timestamps are used for session identification as 
proposed in this study. The ability to link up TCP packets belonging to the 
same user during training will not be impacted whether tapping of 
communication traffic occurs between device and middle box or middle box 
and origin server. This is because this approach does not track the source but 
connections and in this case both connections are surrogates for the single end 
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to end connection between device and origin server. We are not aware of other 
work that leveraged TCP timestamps to track communication sessions as was 
done for this study. 
Training of HTMs is completely unsupervised and leverages the 
tracking strength of the TS value to identify consecutive web visits as 
belonging to the same user session (observation). This is different from the 
supervised training approach used by Yang in her experiments where a label 
(user-id) was used to train her inference model. During training, in this study, 
session identification and user identification are one and the same. During the 
inference stage the assumption that a specific session belongs to a given user 
no longer holds and instead the TS value is only used to identify an anonymous 
session (a set of consecutive web visits belonging to an unknown user that 
make up an observation). The task of assigning an anonymous session to a 
specific user is carried out by the Markov chains performing inference within 
the different layers of each HTM based on past learned patterns of users’ 
sessions (web visits). All HTMs attempt to recognize each anonymous session 
and only one HTM will be able to recognize it better than the other HTMs 
based on its past training.  
Beacken et al. [7] have discovered that the TCP Timestamp field used for 
iphones always starts at the same date/value when the device is restarted but for 
android devices, the TCP timestamp value on device power up is random. They 
state that this allows one to be able to distinguish iphones from android type 
devices. In this study, the TCP time stamp value, a 32 bit value, which 
implements a virtual clock on each device, is used to uniquely identify unique 
sessions associated with a given user. The prototype built for this study 
identifies multiple communication sessions during the training phase of 
learning that belong to different users by tracking the unique TS value (TS) of 
each device. During training, all communication input associated with a given 
<TS> value within a given time window is fed to a hierarchical temporal 
memory (HTM) to identify the communication patterns associated with 
sessions belonging to different users. These communication patterns are 
defined in terms of the destinations (Dest, a number mapping to the IP address 
of the web site) visited by this user.  The timestamp, calculated from the input 
at HTM layer 1, has a resolution of 1 millisecond and represents the passage of 
time with respect to the arrival of input to the HTM. The time stamp is 
specifically needed to distinguish multiple <TS, Dest> input pairs immediately 
following each other with potentially the same TCP time stamp values, as 
either all arriving at the same time or at different times. 
The algorithm in Fig.5 was used to implement communication session 
identification during the training phase of classification and selection of 
appropriate HTMs to perform communication pattern identification. 
Each HTMUx once created runs a virtual clock with a 1 ms resolution used 
to track the TS value of sessions associated with this HTM. The allowed TS 
clock window was computed as follows: Allowed-TS-Clock-Window = [TSv + 
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Clock()] ±  Clock-Skew-Factor. The computation TSv + Clock() needs to 
account for wrap around at 2
32
. The Clock-Skew-Factor is a fixed maximum 
allowed clock skew.  
 
Unfortunately, using a fixed window offset from the currently received 
TCP TS counter to measure clock skew, can potentially either underestimate 
(lose a single tracked user session) the clock skew with a window that is too 
small or overestimate (identify a single user session as belonging to multiple 
user sessions) the clock skew with a window that is too large. A possible way 
to address this problem is to allow for dynamic resynchronization of the HTM 
TS counter with a tracked source based on how much of an offset (within a 
window) a given new received TCP timestamp is from the existing HTM TS 
counter. This approach would use the new TCP time stamp received as the new 
TS counter value each time the new TS value is within the window but does 
not match exactly the current HTM TS counter. This could address the 
potential increase in clock skew that occurs over time overcoming the 
limitations of a fixed HTM TS counter. With this newly proposed approach, it 
will be possible to use a small window size since the algorithm is able to adjust 
to clock skew over time. The benefit of this approach, as well as determining 
the best size for the clock skew window, is an area of further research that 
should be based on the empirical results of studying the characteristics of clock 
skew of mobile devices in real mobile networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 TCP Timestamp Session Identification Algorithm 
 
 
2.2. How the HTM Works 
Each HTM learns and then performs inference. Learning occurs in an 
unsupervised manner, starting from the bottom layer of the HTM, one layer at a 
time. Layer 1 learns first. After that, layer 2 learns and once layer 2 is done 
learning layer 3 completes learning. During training a new HTM is created for 
each user each time a not seen before user session (based on TCP timestamp 
IF ( Given input: <TSv,Dest>, TSv is out of range
 of allowed TS clock skew window for any  
HTMUx )THEN  
// New user not identified before 
            // Create a new HTM to track communication patterns from this  source                  
- Create New HTMUx  (Timestamp:<TSv,Dest>) 
ELSE IF (Given input: <TSv,Dest>, TSv is in range of  allowed TS clock skew window for a single 
HTMUx) THEN  
        // Existing user already being tracked         
- Invoke existing HTMUx  (Timestamp:<TSv,Dest>) 
ELSE  // The TCP timestamp matches more than one HTM  
- Drop the input 
- Update counter:  Unable-to-Distinguish-Session 
ENDIF 
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tracking) is encountered. Learning entails both spatial and temporal learning. 
Spatial learning at layer 1 covers identification of individual sequences of web 
destinations, while at layer 2 and 3 it covers identification of individual 
sequences of coincidences (temporal groups representing Markov chains 
matched from the layer below).  
 
Initial learning is completed at each HTM layer with creation of a single 
Markov graph representing all learned sequences within that HTM layer. At the 
end of training this single graph is split into many variable order Markov 
chains by merging all nodes that are most highly connected into one of several 
Markov chains based on a depth first traversal of the Markov graph (see Fig. 6) 
thus ensuring that sequences are maintained and not broken up and that 
sequences held in Markov chains do not overlap.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Algorithm to create Markov Chains from a single Markov Graph 
 
These Markov chains represent destinations or coincidences (temporal 
groups) that are highly temporally correlated based the specific temporal order 
in which they follow each other. 
After learning is completed at a given HTM layer, playback occurs. During 
playback, each HTM at layer Ln which completed learning is used to bootstrap 
learning for the layer above Ln+1 using the already learned sequences at layer 
Ln. Playback (an approach introduced in this study) improves the time it takes 
to train the HTM and allows higher layers to learn higher level concepts that 
are consistent with the lower level concepts learned by the layers below. In the 
playback stage, learned sequences at layer n are generated in increasing order 
of time, so that layer n+1 can correctly learn higher level concepts from the 
layer below. This in effect simulates the HTM been retrained on the same input 
used to train the layer below. In order to generate sequences in increasing time 
order (from oldest to most recent), each node in the Markov graph holds a 
FIFO queue of timestamps. Each time stamp represents the time when a node 
was created or modified by updating or adding incoming or outgoing links 
While there are more nodes to be processed from the Markov graph  Do 
 
- Pick the next node (seed node) from the Markov graph not yet processed adjacent 
to the “Start” state. This seed node is the first node of a new Markov Chain gi 
 
- Perform a depth first traversal of the Markov graph originating from the seed 
node and add all traversed nodes to Markov Chain gi that have not been processed 
yet  
 
- Potentially merge this Markov Chain gi with another already processed Markov 
Chain gx if Markov Chain gi has elements in common (same node in the Markov 
graph) with Markov Chain gx. When merging, smaller Markov chains get merged 
into larger ones. 
 
EnDo 
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to/from this node. Time ordered sequence generation is achieved by traversing 
the Markov graph at each layer of the HTM, starting from the “start” state, 
while removing from the front of the FIFO queues timestamps associated with 
nodes with the least recent (oldest) timestamp for each transition up to the 
“final” state. 
 
During inference the HTM layer collects input until a sequence is formed. 
The spatial and temporal poolers at each layer of the HTM ensure that 
sequences are created so that nodes that follow each other in space (sequential 
order of inputs) and time (timely order of inputs) are grouped together creating 
a sequence matched against learned sequences of coincidences (stored within 
variable order Markov chains gi). The HTM spatial and temporal poolers 
terminate a sequence and start another under one of the following terminating 
conditions: (TC1) A fixed maximum input size has been processed. (TC2) A 
maximum learned inter destinations arrival rate is exceeded. (TC3) The same 
destination is already present in the sequence (HTM version 1). Note that only 
HTM layer 1 uses terminating condition TC2. 
Each HTM layer matches the input sequence collected against learned 
sequences held in Markov chains and finds the best (longest) matching learned 
sequence (LLS). Each HTM layer computes the feed forward belief ( λ ) of the 
best matching learned sequence (LLS). This feed forward belief combines the 
degree of membership (how well input matches learned sequences)  and 
persistence (how often a matched learned sequence is visited). Belief 
propagation occurs when HTM layer n passes as input the feed forward belief ( 
λ) to HTM layer n+1. Belief propagation for casual (Bayesian) networks was 
first proposed by Judea Pearl [36] and then adapted to HTMs by Deleep 
George [19]. 
The output that is sent to the Max Output Layer (see Fig. 8) from each HTM 
includes identification of the specific HTM and provides the feed forward 
belief of the matched observation input across all layers of that HTM. The Max 
Output Layer aggregates the feed forward beliefs (λOutput) of up to one 
observation worth of data (50 web sites) from each HTM using one of seven 
HTM algorithms and then selects the HTM (user) with the maximum 
aggregated feed forward belief value among all HTMs as the one that best 
matches the  HTM layer 1 input.  
 
HTMs use one of seven algorithms proposed in this study (detailed in 
section “HTM Algorithms Calculations”) to aggregate feed forward beliefs and 
to determine how well an observation matches HTMs’ learned input. Each one 
of the seven different HTM algorithms (based on the HTM layer where they 
are applied 1 or 3) combines feed forward beliefs associated with a given input 
observation based on one of three generic algorithms: average, weighted sum 
and path probability. The average based algorithm simply computes the 
averages of feed forward beliefs associated with a given observation. Weighted 
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sum algorithms (BottomUp and TopTop) use weights proportional to the size 
of an observation matched by a given feed forward belief. The BottomUp 
algorithm aggregates the feed forward belief with weights proportional to an 
observation at layer 1 so that the degree of membership calculation at higher 
layers will be impacted by this weight as the feed forward belief travels up the 
HTM layers (see Table 1). The TopTop algorithm aggregates the feed forward 
belief with weights proportional to an observation matched at layer 3. The Path 
Probability algorithm leverages the idea of independence among feed forward 
beliefs and simply multiplies together the feed forward beliefs belonging to a 
given observation. 
 
 
Figure 7 Hierarchical Temporal Memory layers 
2.3. Feed Forward Belief Calculations 
As shown in Fig. 7 the key computation performed by HTMs creates 
groups of feed forward beliefs (λ<FFBs>) that match the input presented to 
each HTM layer. The idea is to find the longest learned sequence (LLS) out of 
Page 16 of 68 
 
all the learned sequences in all of the Markov chains in a given HTM layer 
which best matches (has the highest degree of membership (DM) as shown in 
equation (8)) the input sequence (IS). The calculation of DM and persistence 
(SP equation (7)) of the matched LLS represents how well inferred input (IS) is 
matched against learned input. In terms of notation: (Abbreviation) Function 
name (Arg1,…Argn) represents a function “Function name” which takes n 
arguments Arg1,…Argn and is referenced using the abbreviated name 
“Abbreviation”. The rest of this section presents the key calculations necessary 
to compute feed forward beliefs (equations 9 and 10) that are calculated within 
each HTM layer before being propagated up to next layer. Refer to Appendix I 
for specific explanations of abbreviations used in this section. 
 
 
 (ALLLS_Cond) Adjusted Length LLS Condition(IS, cLLS)  =  
       if IS is a substring of cLLS and IS1 = cLLS1 and | cLLS | > |IS| 
 
(ALLLS)Adjusted Length LLS(IS, cLLS)   =  {
 |𝐼𝑆|                           ALLLS_Cond
max(|𝐼𝑆|, |𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆|)    otherwise
 
 
 (LCSm) Longest Common Subsequence Measure(IS, cLLS)  =        
|𝐿𝐶𝑆(𝐼𝑆,𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆)  |
𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆(𝐼𝑆,𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆)  
       (1) 
(LCSUm) Longest Common Substring Measure (IS,cLLS) =             
|𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑢(𝐼𝑆,𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆)  |
𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆(𝐼𝑆,𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆)  
     (2) 
 
See Appendix C for an example of how to use equations (1) and (2). 
 
(Fq) Frequency of visits (cLLSi) = Number of times cLLSi occurs in Markov chain gi  
within this HTM layer across all Markov chains in that HTM layer                             (3) 
 
NLS  = Number of all learned sequences within a given HTM layer 
 
(Ps) Persistence (cLLS) =      
𝐹𝑞(𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆)
𝑁𝐿𝑆
                                                   (4)
  
Similarity Weights = Ws + Wu + Wp = 1.0                                                                   (5) 
 where in this study Ws = 0.495, Wu = 0.495, Wp = 0.01 
 
(SS) Sequence Similarity (IS, cLLS)  =                                                                (6) 
                   (LCSm(IS, cLLS) × Ws) + (LCSUm(IS, cLLS) × Wu ) 
 
(SP) Sequence Persistence (cLLS)   = (Ps(cLLS) × Wp)                                               (7) 
(DM) Degree of Membership (IS, cLLS)  =                                                                (8) 
    𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝐿𝑆(SS (IS, cLLS))                        when  |∀s,  SS (IS, cLLS)> SS(IS,s) | == 1 (8.a) 
    𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝐿𝑆(SS (IS, cLLS) , SP(cLLS))    when  |∀s,  SS (IS, cLLS)> SS(IS,s) |  >  1   (8.b) 
    where s = all learned sequences, including cLLS, in a given HTM layer 
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The best matching LLS is that candidate LLS (cLLS), in a given HTM 
layer, that has the maximum degree of membership value when measured 
against the input sequence (IS). For instance, assume IS = <S1, S3> which 
matches cLLS1 <S1,S2,S3,S4> and cLLS2 = <S1, S3, S6> in Fig.14, then LLS 
which satisfies DM(IS,cLLS) is cLLS2 since: 
 LCSm(IS,cLLS)  = LCSm(IS, cLLS2) = 2/2 
 LCSUm =(IS,cLLS)  = LCSu(IS, cLLS2) = 2/2 
 LCSm(IS,cLLS)  = LCSm(IS, cLLS1) = 2/4 
 LCSUm =(IS,cLLS)  = LCSu(IS, cLLS1) = 1/4 
 SS(IS, cLLS1) = (0.5 × 0.495)  +  (0.25 × 0.495)   
 SS(IS, cLLS2) = (1 × 0.495)     +  (1 × 0.495)  
 SS(IS, cLLS2) > SS(IS, cLLS1) then  based on (8.a)  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝐿𝑆(SS (IS, cLLS)) is  
              cLLS2. 
 
When more than one cLLS sequence exists with the same maximum 
sequence similarity values then the more persistent of these cLLS sequences is 
chosen. Consider a different example where IS = <S1, S6> and from Fig.14 
cLSS1 = <S1, S8, S6> and cLSS2 = <S1, S3, S6>, in this case equation 8.b is used 
since two sequences have the same sequence similarity values, namely 
|SS(IS,cLLS1) = SS(IS,cLLS2)| > 1. In this case, LLS = <S1, S3, S6> since 
SP(cLLS2) = 2/16 >  SP(cLLS1) = 1/16  
  
(FFB) Feed Forward Belief (IS, LLS) =                                                                       (9) 
            min(1.0, DM (IS, LLS) + SP(LLS)) where min is the minimum function 
 
FFB(IS,LLS) is the feed forward belief used with all HTM algorithms except 
for path probability. The feed forward belief applied with the path probability 
HTM algorithm (see section “HTM Algorithm Calculations” for details) is 
shown below: 
(FFB_PP) Path Probability of LLS (LLS) =                                                               (10) 
P(LLS) =   P(LLS1) × P(LLS2| LLS1) × P(LLS3| LLS1 LLS2) × .. P(LLSn| LLS1…LLSn-1), 
where:      
P(LLS1)  =    {
𝐹𝑞(𝐿𝐿𝑆1)
NLS
                       if 𝐿𝐿𝑆1  =  𝐼𝑆1
penalty =  0.0001         otherwise
                                                    (11) 
 where penalty is an error probability for mismatches against IS.  
 
Fq(LSS j→k) = Frequency of visits across node transition j→k 
 
P(LLSk | LLSj)  =   
𝑭𝒒(𝑳𝑳𝑺𝒋→𝒌)
𝑭𝒒(𝑳𝑳𝑺𝒋)
        where  k,j > 1                                           (12)   
 
Page 18 of 68 
 
2.4. Feed Forward Belief Propagation Calculations 
Feed forward beliefs propagate through HTM layers, as shown in Fig. 7, 
following the formulas shown in Table 1. Feed forward beliefs exiting the 
output (last) HTM layer will be directed to the Max HTM output layer, shared 
across all HTMs, which aggregates feed forward beliefs for an each 
observation worth of inputs (see Fig. 8).  
 
Table 1. FEED FORWARD BELIEFS FOR EACH HTM LAYER 
HTM Layers Feed Forward Beliefs Propagation 
MAX HTM 
Output layer 
Output 
(𝑶𝑹)𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕 = < HTM_name, MAX_FFB_HTMs, Observation 
input>, 𝐻𝑇𝑀_𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 is the name of the HTM matching Observation input with the 
highest aggregated feed forward belief value computed using MAX_FFB_HTMs  
for 𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 over all HTMs. 
HTM1..M  
Layer 3 
Output/MAX 
HTM Output 
layer Input 
 
λOutput = {
𝑭𝑭𝑩_𝑷𝑷𝒈𝒌(𝑳𝑳𝑺)  ×  (𝑰𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒈𝒋..𝒋+𝑵)   if HTM algorithm is Path Probability
𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒌(𝑺𝒈𝒋..𝒋+𝑵, 𝑳𝑳𝑺) × (𝑰𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒈𝒋..𝒋+𝑵)                                           otherwise
       
                                                                                                                                      (13) 
 where  1 ≤  k  ≤ Number of Markov Chains at HTM layer 3. Note that when the 
HTM is configured with only 1 layer then λL2 = λOutput 
 
 
HTM1..M 
Layer2 
Output/ 
HTM1..M 
Layer3 Input 
 
λL3  = {
𝑭𝑭𝑩_𝑷𝑷𝒈𝒋(𝑳𝑳𝑺)   ×   (𝑰𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵)       if HTM algorithm is Path Probability
𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒋(𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵, 𝑳𝑳𝑺) × (𝑰𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵 )                                                        otherwise
                                  
                                                                                                                                      (14) 
 
 where  1 ≤  j ≤ Number of Markov Chains at HTM layer L2 
HTM1..M 
Layer1 
Output/ 
HTM1..M 
Layer2 Input 
 
λL2 ={
𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊(𝑰𝑺, 𝑳𝑳𝑺) × (
|𝑰𝑺|
𝑶𝑺
)                                    if HTM algorithm is BottomUP
𝑭𝑭𝑩_𝑷𝑷𝒈𝒊(𝑳𝑳𝑺)                                     if HTM algorithm is Path Probability 
𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊(𝑰𝑺, 𝑳𝑳𝑺)                                                                                      otherwise 
                    
                                                                                                                                      (15) 
where  1 ≤  i  ≤ Number of Markov Chains at HTM layer L1 and Observation size   
is 50 
HTM1..M 
Layer1 Input 
received 
from the 
network 
Timestamp<TS,Dest1> … Timestamp<TS,DestN> 
 
The input activation level equation shown below measures the strength of a 
match between input and learned sequences and is further defined in Appendix 
I.   
(𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑔𝑖..𝑖+𝑁) Input Activation Level(𝑆𝑔𝑖..𝑖+𝑁 , 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝒈𝒊) =                                               (16)      
                 
                                                                                min (1.0,
 ∑ 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝒈𝒊
|𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵|
𝒊=𝟏
|𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵|
 )     
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2.5. HTM Algorithms Calculations 
The seven HTM algorithms described in previous sections are 
implemented based on the three generic algorithms defined by equations 18, 19 
and 20. The algorithms are deployed mainly in the Max Output Layer and also 
across the HTM layers for the Path probability and BottomUP algorithms. Fig. 
8 shows λOutput which represents the feed forward belief output from layer 3 of 
an HTM to the Max Output layer and 𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 which is a sequence of 
such feed forward beliefs. These parameters are used by the Max output layer 
to compute the highest valued feed forward belief for a given observation using 
the formula shown below. 
 
(MAX_FFB_HTMs) Max Feed Forward Belief  for HTMs(𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁) =            (17)                                                    
                                                                                                                                   
                      𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐻𝑇𝑀1..𝑀 (HTM_Algorithma( 𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 )) where a is one of 3 
generic HTM algorithms (Average, Weighted Sum, Path Probability) , 1 ≤  M  
≤ number of HTMs/users learned during training, HTM1..M is the name of all 
HTMs learned during training.  
Figure 8 HTM Max Output Layer Inputs and Output 
The three generic HTM algorithms which process feed forward beliefs 
within the Max HTM Output Layer are shown below: 
 
NB = |𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 | is the number of beliefs per observation. 
 
Average (𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁) = (∑ λOutput
𝑁𝐵
𝑘=1 𝑘
) /NB                                                      (18) 
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 Weighted Sum ( 𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 , ISk, OS)  =                          (19)  
                                 ∑ (λOutput 𝑘  ×
|𝐼𝑆𝑘|
𝑂𝑆
)𝑁𝐵𝑘=1    where ISk is HTM layer 1 input 
sequence associated with λOutput𝑘 and OS = Observation size (50 web 
destinations at HTM layer 1)   
  Path Probability (𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁) =  ∏ λOutput 𝑘
𝑁𝐵
𝑘=1                                                (20)        
See Appendix E for an example on how the Max HTM Ouput layer utilizes 
HTM algorithms. Table 2 provides more details about which HTM layer 
provides inputs to the Max Output layer for specific HTM algorithms. 
 
Table 2 HTM Algorithms 
HTM Algorithms HTM Generic 
Algorithms 
(HTM_Algorithma) 
HTM Layers  
supplying input to 
Max HTM Output  
Average Average 1,3 
TopTop Weighted Sum 3 
ButtomUP Average 1,3 
Path Probability Path Probability 1,3 
 
How to read table 2: The Average and BottomUP HTM algorithms use the 
average generic HTM algorithm with inputs to Max HTM Output Layer from 
HTM layers 1 and 3 (see Fig.8). The TopTop HTM algorithm uses the 
weighted sum algorithm with inputs exclusively from layer 3. Allowing HTM 
algorithms to generate inputs from either HTM layer 1 or 3 was done to enable 
verification of HTMs with and without HTM hierarchies. The BottomUp 
algorithm, takes the average of feed forward beliefs at the Max HTM Output 
Layer computed using the weighted sum at layer 1 (see Table 1 equation (15)). 
This was done to normalize differences in calculations due to large number of 
beliefs produced from layer 1 versus the few number of beliefs produced from 
layer 3 of HTMs.  
3. Experiments 
The HTM together with the entire set of tools needed to support the 
experiments conducted in this study were developed from scratch in Java. It 
became critical then to qualify the HTM to guarantee its correct 
implementation before performing any experiments. A “calibration” procedure 
was used to ensure that experiments run using all seven HTM algorithms, as 
well as, all alternate Markov chain based algorithms would be able to recognize 
users using their own trained data set instead of a different test data set, 
achieving in the case of synthetic data sets, 100% recall accuracy results. This 
initial calibration criterion was used to qualify each one of the HTMs and 
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alternate Markov chains algorithms as being correctly implemented with 
respect to their ability to accurately train and infer their own input. It became 
also important to create reference data sets for the experiments themselves, 
allowing validation of the algorithms against a well understood baseline. For 
this purpose synthetic data sets were created (see Appendix F for a description 
of how synthetic data was created to be as close as possible to real network 
data). Only if the HTM and alternate Markov chain algorithms could achieve 
high levels of recall accuracy with these synthetic data sets would a 
corresponding new set of experiments be conducted with real network data 
extracted from an operator cellular network. In this study a total of 514 
experiments were conducted utilizing synthetic data and 228 experiments 
utilizing real network data. 
Table 3 shows the entire set of experiments conducted in this study. All 
experiments test the ability of the seven HTM algorithms to attribute 
communication traffic to users under test. In addition, four alternate algorithms 
based on Markov chains (MC) were also tested (E1, E2, E6) in order to compare 
the HTM inference recall accuracy performance against traditional algorithms 
that, like HTM algorithms, recognize sequences leveraging Markov chains. A 
single experiment usually entails training either the HTM using one of the 
seven HTM algorithms or training one of four MC algorithms on a specific 
data set (synthetic or real) to perform a specific experiment such as user 
identification. User identification experiments with synthetic data sets were 
performed without noise (E1) and with noise introduced in the test data set in 
the form of either concept drift (E2) or in the form of DOS or Phish attacks (E3, 
E4). The ability to maintain high levels of recall accuracy performance with 
increasing number of users (E1, E5) and increasing number of destinations (E1) 
was also measured. Similar experiments were also performed utilizing data sets 
collected from a real cellular network (E6-E11).  Experiments E13 and E14 verify 
the ability of the HTM to identify users, utilizing real network data, by 
continuing to learn during the inference phase of the experiment instead of just 
learning during the train phase of the experiment. Experiments E12 measure the 
accuracy of session identification performed during the train phase of user 
identification experiments. 
 
Markov chain based algorithms were chosen because of Markov chains’ 
ability to recognize sequences and because the HTM also uses Markov chains, 
albeit with modifications. The following types of Markov chains (MC) were 
used to baseline this work: [Fixed Order] 1st Order Markov Chains, [Fixed 
Order] 3rd Order Markov Chains, [Variable Order] All-K Markov model, 
where K=3, [Variable Order] (PPM-C) Prediction by Partial Match, where K=3. 
In this study, mismatches found by MC based algorithms between learned and 
new input sequences are assigned a fixed penalty when using fixed order 
Markov chains and a variable penalty proportional to the number of different 
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destinations matched so far and their frequencies when using variable order 
Markov chains.  
 
Table 3. FOURTEEN SETS OF EXPERIMENT FOR THIS STUDY 
Experiment Types (E1-14)  
 
Data Type 
 
Number of 
Experiments 
using HTM 
Algorithms (7)  
Number of 
Experiments  
using 
alternate 
MC 
Algorithms 
(4)  
(E1) User Identification no concept drift Synthetic 210 120 
(E2) User Identification with concept drift Synthetic 84 48 
(E3) User Identification under DOS attack Synthetic 21 - 
(E4) User Identification under Phish attack Synthetic 21 - 
(E5) HTM Accuracy Scalability Synthetic 10 - 
(E6)  User Identification Alternate MC     Real - 24 
(E7)  User Identification HTM2++      Real 42 - 
(E8) )User Identification HTM2      Real 42 - 
(E9) User Identification HTM1     Real 42 - 
(E10) User Identification under DOS attack     Real 21 - 
(E11) User Identification under Phish attack     Real 21 - 
(E12) Session Identification     Real 18 - 
(E13) User Identification continuous learning     Real 12 - 
(E14) User Identification under DOS attack      
         with continuous learning 
    Real 6 - 
 
3.1. Experiments Using Synthetic Data 
Three hundred and thirty experiments (E1) were conducted using synthetic 
data without simulating context drift which used 1000, 5000, and 10,000 
visited web destinations. These experiments simulated 5, 20, 50, 100, 500 users 
accessing the network using 5 days’ worth of train data  and either one or two 
days’ worth of test data  or just 3 observations (one observation “Obs”  equals 
50 visited web destinations) worth of test data per user.  For instance, Table 21 
in Appendix H shows that for 5 users and 1000 visited web destinations, 11 
experiments are executed using 5 train days and 1 test day (5/1), 11 
experiments  using 2 days’ worth of test data(5/2), 11 experiments  using 3 
observations (3 Obs) worth of test data for a total of 33 experiments. On the 
other hand for 500 users using 5000 destinations Table 21 shows 11 
experiments being executed using 3 observations in the test data set. 
All 132 concept drift experiments (E2) shown in Table 22 in Appendix H 
involved visits to 1000 web destinations with 5 users, with 5,10,15,20 training 
days and 2,3,4,5 test days’ worth of test data respectively (see Appendix F for a 
description of how concept drift was simulated using a random walk algorithm). 
Concept drift is introduces in the form of 20% new destinations and 10% new 
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transitions between destinations not in the original train data set. The first line 
of Table 22 represents the baseline (no concept drift). 
 
In this study, users are identified based on their normal behavior and 
anomalous traffic is introduced as a form of noise to understand how much user 
identification accuracy is lost when noise (in the form of an attack) is 
introduced in the normal communication traffic patterns of users. The idea is 
not to identify the attack traffic but to identify normal traffic (tied to a specific 
user) in spite of the presence of embedded attack traffic (noise). The 
assumption is that when noise is introduced in the form of a phish or DOS 
attack from the device, it is due to the device having been compromised, 
possibly based on a download of an infected application. As the subscriber uses 
his mobile device to browse the internet (normal behavior) the malicious app is 
at work in the background, launching its phish or DOS attacks. Table 23 in 
Appendix H shows twenty-one  experiments (E3) which were conducted with 
HTM algorithms by simulating denial of service attacks, embedded within 
synthetic network data, where the attack is initiated from individual devices 
during the test phase to a number of destinations (5, 10, 20) learned at train 
time. The destinations are attacked repeatedly over time (within a time interval 
of 5, 10, 20 ms and spaced by a fixed time interval of 5 ms). The idea is to 
determine how well the HTM can continue to identify users before and after 
the attack. In these experiments 10 users are used and 4 of them are assumed to 
be infected and to start DOS attacks during the test phase. The motivation for 
attacking destinations learned at train time is based on the assumption that 
perpetrators of DOS attacks typically target sites or services hosted on high-
profile web servers such as on-line retailers, banks, credit card payment 
gateways which are likely to have been visited by the user, thus making the 
attack less likely to be detected (less conspicuous). 
 
Table 24 in Appendix H shows twenty-one experiments which simulate 
phishing attacks (E4), embedded within synthetic network data, which were run 
using HTM algorithms. For these experiments, attacks are initiated from 
individual devices during the test phase where unique destinations (1, 3, 5) are 
randomly selected from outside the user training data set (to simulate access to 
never visited before web phish sites) and attacked within a time interval (1ms, 
3ms, 5ms) spaced by a random time intervals (1 minute – 1 hour). 
 
Ten scalability experiments (E5) were also run using the two best 
performing HTM algorithms to measure the ability of the HTM to accurately 
identify users as the number of users increased from 150 to 500 users 
3.2. Experiments Using Real Network Data 
The next set of user identification experiments used real network data 
collected from a CDMA/LTE cellular data network in North America over a 
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period of approximately a month. Experiments were conducted against HTMs 
using the following parameters: 5 and 10 users, 5 train days and 1 test day, 5 
train days and 2 test days, 10 train days and 3 test days. The actual number of 
different web destinations visited by all users over the month was: 4903 
destinations for 5 train days/1 test day, 5221 destinations for 5 train days/2 test 
days , 6672 destinations for 10 train days/3 test days. 
The data originally collected from the network was for 50 users for a 
period of one month, unfortunately only 10 users used enough communication 
data to support the train and test timelines proposed for this study.  
One hundred twenty six user identification experiments (E7, E8, E9) were 
conducted using real network data running seven HTM algorithms.  Table 25 in 
Appendix H shows the configuration for these experiments. For instance, 10 
users leveraging 5 days of train data and 1 day worth of test data (5/1). 
Twenty four user identification experiments were run using alternate 
Markov based algorithms (E6). Forty two experiments (E9) uncovered 
shortcomings in the HTM state machines when handling repetitive consecutive 
web destinations embedded in the real network input data set. The HTM was 
modified to address these shortcomings and the same 42 user identification 
experiments (E8), using the same data set, were run to determine if the HTM 
accuracy could be improved. Finally, repetitive web destinations occurring at 
the exact same time (same timestamp) were removed from the input data set   
and the 42 same user identification experiments were run again (E7). 
 
Twenty one experiments which identify users in spite of simulated DOS 
attacks (E10) and 21 experiments which identify users in spite of simulated 
Phish attacks (E11) were also run using real network data (using parameters 
shown in Tables 23, 24). 
 
The inability to collect TCP timestamps from the real cellular network 
limited session identification experiments to utilizing synthetically created TCP 
timestamps. It thus became necessary to conduct a set of experiments (E12) to 
determine how noise introduced by different session identification algorithms 
impacts train data and the ensuing inference accuracy of HTMs. Session 
Identification experiments were performed by creating training data sets for the 
HTM that use one of three session identification algorithms: (1) Source IP, (2) 
Sliding Window, (3) TCP Timestamp. The train data set to be modified by the 
session identification algorithms uses real network data. The experiments 
include a preliminary step which runs the session identification algorithms 
against real network data to produce a new altered train data set that is 
modified based on the bias introduced by each session identification algorithm 
run under conditions that introduce noise. The experiment would then train the 
HTM with this altered train data set and use the original real network data as 
the test data set. Using the “Source IP” algorithm, all input with the same 
source IP address belongs to the same user. The “Sliding Time Window” 
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algorithm selects the first (oldest) HTTP request in a time window based on the 
source IP address and assign it to user-x, then all subsequent HTTP requests 
within the time window for that source IP address, belong to the same user-x. 
As long as data is available for user-x within the window over time, then that 
session belongs to user-x otherwise that session is assigned to a new user 
(source IP address) selected at random based on users who have data falling 
within the sliding time window. Note that the sliding window approach 
presented in other related literature [4, 46] only specified that requests 
occurring together in time belong to the same session. No other detail was 
given as to how a specific session was identified among others occurring at 
similar times. Thus, the use of the oldest source IP in a given time window as 
the seed for identifying a given user is proposed in this paper in support of this 
approach. The TCP Timestamp algorithm uses the TCP Time stamp values 
within a clock skew window to track different users. 
 A total of 18 session identification experiments were run where the source 
IP and TCP Timestamps leveraged real life scenarios to alter the original train 
data set. This was done by random simulation of recycling of the same source 
IP address among users as done by NATs and web proxy middle-boxes and by 
random simulation of re-attachment of a device with a new source IP as done 
when users move across networks. For TCP timestamp, data loss was randomly 
simulated by creating holes in the data stream as well as random simulation of 
device power off/on. The number of users in these experiments is 5 and 10 for 
5 train days, with the following additional experiment parameters: (Source IP) :  
10% recycle source IP address and 10% access network re-attaches; (Sliding 
Window): Sliding window size in seconds (1, 3, 5, 60); (TCP Timestamp): 
10% data loss and 10% device power on/off.  
In order to determine if it was possible to further improve HTM user 
attribution accuracy with real network data in the presence of real concept drift, 
continuous learning logic was added to the HTM. Continuous learning was 
implemented by allowing the output of the Max HTM Output layer, which 
identifies which HTMx a given observation belongs to, to be sent back to layer 
1 of that HTMx so that it can learn that observation. HTMx then during 
inference uses a mechanism similar to “playback” to learn the just received 
observation across all HTM layers. Two types of continuous learning were 
implemented: (1) Continuous Baseline which lets the Max HTM Output Layer 
send feedback to the correct HTM that matched the given observation.  (2) 
Continuous Inference which lets the Max HTM Output Layer send feedback to 
the inferred HTM (which could be right or wrong) that matched the given 
observation. Twelve user identification experiments (E13) with continuous 
learning were conducted for 5 and 10 users using the BottomUP approach run 
at HTM layer 3. 
 
In order to determine if continuous learning could improve the HTM 
accuracy in spite of DOS or Phish attacks, 6 experiments (E14) were run. These 
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experiments were conducted using real network data for 10 users using 5 days’ 
worth of train data and 2 days’ worth of test data, using the BottomUp Layer 3 
HTM algorithm and applying simulated DOS and Phish attacks configured 
with  the same parameters previously described for these experiments in Tables 
23, 24. 
4. Results 
Due to the large number of experiments conducted for this study only key 
results will be reported in this section. Following are key findings from these 
experiments:  
 HTM algorithms such as Bottom Up and TopTop tend to provide the 
highest levels of recall accuracy and scalability among all HTM 
algorithms.  
 The HTM algorithm Path Probability tends to perform the worst among all 
HTM algorithms.  
  Alternate Markov chains based algorithms (1st and 3rd Order  Markov 
Chains, All-K and PPM) perform very poorly in terms of recall accuracy 
and recall accuracy scalability compared to HTM algorithms. However, 
Alternate Markov Chains based algorithms excel at recognizing their own 
train input.  
 HTM recall accuracy is strongly influenced by the number of visited web 
destinations and the pattern of behavior (which web sited are visited) of 
users, specifically:  
o Recall accuracy for HTM algorithms improves dramatically 
moving from 1000 to 5000 web destinations visited by all users. 
Beyond 5000 web destinations accuracy levels off.  
o Continuous repetitive patterns (large number of identical web 
destinations visited over a very short time window) found in real 
network data impact negatively HTM algorithms’ recall accuracy.  
o User behavior changes (new web sites visited) from behavior 
learned at train time (concept drift) do impact negatively HTM 
recall accuracy.  Concept drift that splits randomly learned 
sequences of web destinations has the most negative impact on 
HTM recall accuracy performance. 
  Continuous learning does mitigate the negative impact of 
concept drift on HTMs’ recall accuracy performance.  
 Recall accuracy reported by HTM algorithms at layers 1 and 3 is generally 
comparable.  
 HTMs tolerate reasonably well noise introduced in test datasets in the form 
of DOS or Phish attacks.  
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 TCP timestamps can be effective in session identification, however if noise 
is present in the training data set, experiments showed that the sliding 
window algorithm can be a more accurate session identification algorithm 
4.1. Results using Synthetic Data Sets 
Based on experiment set (E1), alternate MC based algorithms with one day 
worth of test data never produced recall accuracy statistics above 42% (see 
Table 4 below) and when the test data set consisted of 3 observations, these 
algorithms never produced recall statistics over 66% (see Table 5). In contrast, 
HTM algorithms produced accuracy statistics (recall statistics) as high as 99% 
for a sample of 100 users with one day worth of test data as shown in Table 4 
and 99% recall accuracy for a sample of 500 users with 3 observations worth of 
test data as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 4 -  5-100 users, 5000 Destinations, 5 Train Days and 1 Test Day Synthetic Data (E1)  
(E1) HTM and Alternate 
Algorithms   
 Variable Number of Observations per user  
 
5 users, 5000 
destinations, 5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
20 users, 5000 
destinations, 5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
50 users, 5000 
destinations, 5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
100 users, 
5000 
destinations
, 5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
HTM  L1 Simple Ave 0.988 0.91 0.918 0.89 
HTM  L1 Bottom Up  0.99 0.99 0.986 0.96 
HTM  L1Path Probability 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.92 
HTM  L3 Simple Ave 0.988 0.91 0.91 0.89 
HTM  L3 Bottom Up  0.99 0.99 0.98 0.967 
HTM  L 3 TopTop  1.00 0.997 0.999 0.986 
HTM  L3 Path Probability 0.718 0.46 0.38 0.298 
First Order MC  0.42 0.125 0.0277 0.0139 
Third Order MC 0.3579 0.120 0.0277 0.013 
All K=3 0.42 0.125 0.0277 0.0139 
PPM 0.42 0.125 0.0277 0.0139 
 
 
Table 5 -  5-500 users, 5000 destinations, for 5 Train days and 3 Observations for test Synthetic Data (E1) 
(E1) HTM and 
Alternate Algorithms 
 3 Test Observations /user  
 
5 users, 
5000 
destinations, 
5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
20 users, 
5000 
destinatio
ns, 5 
Train/1T
est, Ave 
Recall 
50 users, 
5000 
destinations, 
5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
100 users, 
5000 
destination
s, 5 
Train/1Tes
t, Ave 
Recall 
500 users, 
5000 
destinations, 
5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
HTM  L1 Simple Ave 1.0 0.966 0.886 0.91 0.829 
HTM  L1 Bottom Up  1.0 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.949 
HTM  L 1Path 
Probability 1.0 0.966 0.93 0.946 0.88 
HTM  L3 Simple Ave 1.0 0.966 0.87 0.91 0.83 
HTM  L3 Bottom Up  1.0 0.98 0.97 0.976 0.946 
HTM  L3 TopTop  1.0 1.0 0.99 1.0 0.986 
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(E1) HTM and 
Alternate Algorithms 
 3 Test Observations /user  
 
5 users, 
5000 
destinations, 
5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
20 users, 
5000 
destinatio
ns, 5 
Train/1T
est, Ave 
Recall 
50 users, 
5000 
destinations, 
5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
100 users, 
5000 
destination
s, 5 
Train/1Tes
t, Ave 
Recall 
500 users, 
5000 
destinations, 
5 
Train/1Test, 
Ave Recall 
HTM  L3 Path 
Probability 0.53 0.45 0.366 0.329 0.209 
First Order MC 0.66 0.25 0.126 0.069 0.0186 
Third Order MC 0.60 0.25 0.120 0.066 0.0186 
All K=3 0.66 0.25 0.126 0.069 0.0186 
PPM 0.66 0.25 0.126 0.069 0.0186 
Why do Markov chains based algorithms perform so poorly in these 
experiments? Fig. 9 shows, the PPM statistics for the experiments run with 5 
users with results shown in Table 5. The percentage of hits and misses were 
computed for all k orders across all users. The PPM algorithm starts at the 
highest k order (k=3) and each time the context (input) of size k of the input is 
not matched the algorithm scales down to a lower k order (matches a shorter 
portion of the input).  Fig. 9 shows that the PPM algorithm operates at k order 
= 0 about 80% of the time. This means that 80% of the time the PPM algorithm 
fails to match its input, applies a penalty to the path probability for the input 
and moves down to a lower k order Markov graph until it reaches k order = 0. 
This explains the poor performance of PPM and other higher K order 
algorithms (3rd Order MC, All-K) and also explains why higher order Markov 
chain algorithms have accuracy performance recall output values similar to 
lower order Markov chain algorithms. 
 
 
Figure 9 PPM Matches and Miss Matches per K-Order = 3 (E1) 
 
Accuracy reported by HTM algorithms scales better with increasing 
number of users and web destinations than the accuracy reported by alternate 
Markov chains based algorithms as shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows the 
difference in recall accuracy between experiments(E1, Table 21 Appendix H)  
run for 5 and 100 users, with different number of visited web destination (1000, 
5000, 10000), over 5 train days and 1 test day using synthetic data. The high 
and low recall values of all HTM algorithms and alternate algorithms were 
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recorded and the difference between accuracy values for 5 and 100 users was 
tabulated. Table 6 shows that HTM algorithms scale better (smaller 
differences) than alternate algorithms with a maximum of 13% loss in accuracy 
when tracking 1000 web destinations moving from 5 to 100 users compared to 
41% loss in accuracy for alternate MC based algorithms running equivalent 
experiments. For 5000 and 10,000 web destinations, the scale factor for the 
HTM algorithm improves even more and is as low as 1% for high recall values. 
 
 
 
Table 6 Recall Accuracy Scaling from 5 up to 100 Users for 5 Train Days and 1 Test Day (E1)  
Number of 
Destinations 
Scale Factor based on Recall Differences from 5 to 100 Users 
 HTM High 
Recall 
Difference 
HTM Low Recall 
Difference 
Alternate 
Algorithm High 
Recall Difference 
Alternate 
Algorithm Low 
Recall Difference 
1000 
Destinations 
0.13 0.05 0.407 0.342 
5000 
Destinations 
0.01 0.1 0.41 0.35 
10,000 
Destinations 
0.01 0.06 0.41 0.41 
 
To further understand how accuracy is specifically impacted by the number 
of destinations in the data set. Synthetic data accuracy performance increases 
substantially (E1, Table 21 Appendix H) as number of destinations increases 
from 1000 to 5000 (from 54% recall accuracy to 99% for 500 users with 5 days 
of train data and 3 observations of test data), minimally from 5000 to 10,000. 
Synthetic data accuracy scalability measured for increasing number of users 
with 5000 web destinations visited (E5) is high for the top 2 best performing 
HTM algorithms (BottomUp at layer 1 and TopTop) consistently at 99% recall 
accuracy for 150, 250 350, 450, 500 users (see Fig. 10).  
 
Figure 10 Accuracy scalability Synthetic data, 5 Train and 1 Test Days (E5) 
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The weighted sum based HTM algorithms (BottomUp at layers 1 and 3 and 
TopTop ) outperformed all other HTM algorithms. To understand why, let us 
compare the average based algorithm to the weighted sum based algorithm. 
Consider an observation of size 5 (5 web sites visited) where the input received 
by the HTM is <1, 2, 3, 4, 5> which matches 100% of the learned input as 5 
distinct nodes (5 sequences each of size 1). That is, for the average HTM 
algorithm FFB= 1+1+1+1+1/5 = 1.0 (100%). Now consider the calculation (as 
done for the BottomUP algorithm) for the average weighted sum proportional 
to the matched input FFB = [(1/5) + (1/5) + (1/5) + (1/5)  + (1/5) ] /5 = 1/5 
(20%). Now assume a new input <1, 2, 3, 4, 5> which matches 100% of the 
learned input as a single sequence of 5 nodes (1 sequence of size 5). In this 
case, using the average algorithm FFB= 1/1 = 1 (100%), while using the 
average weighted sum algorithm FFB = [5/5]/1 = 1 = (100%). The average 
algorithm produces the same recall accuracy whether an entire sequence is 
matched or only individual elements of the sequence are matched, while 
weighted sum based algorithms give more weight to longer sequences over 
shorter ones increasing the discriminating power of the solution.  
 
In order to verify the ability of the HTM to handle noise, several 
experiments were conducted. Experiments (E2) using synthetic data with 
simulated concept drift via “Random Walk” show a reduction in accuracy of up 
to 25%, indicating that the HTM is susceptible to random splitting of learned 
sequences. Concept drift which adds new connections at the end of learned 
sequences reduces accuracy only by up to 11%.  Experiments which simulated 
DOS attacks (E3) run across all HTM algorithms with synthetic data reduced 
accuracy by up to 11%, while experiments which simulated Phish attacks (E4) 
reduced accuracy only by up to 5%. 
 
4.2. Results using Real Network Data Sets 
Experiments were also conducted with real network data collected over a 
period of a month from a cellular data network. Train data sets ranged from 5 
to 10 days and 1, 2, 3 test days. Results, at first were modest (E9). For instance, 
for 5 users with 5 days’ worth of train data and 2 days’ worth of test data 
produced results with recall accuracy as high as 81% for HTM algorithms and 
10% for Markov chains based algorithms. Visual observation of this data set 
showed a high recurrence of repeating continuous patterns of a single 
destination (e.g. 48, 48, 48, 48) within observations compared to similar 
measurements for synthetic data. This was confirmed by intra-observation 
repetitiveness (IOR) measurements which for some users were as high as 94 %, 
indicating that within a user observation on average there were 47 repeating 
destinations out of 50. Calibration of real network data run against the HTM 
also showed poor performance with the best HTM algorithms (ButtomUp and 
TopTop) scoring recall accuracy values (for experiments E9 with 5 users, 5 
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train and 2 test days’ worth of data) ranging from 71% to 100%. Unexpectedly, 
alternate Markov chain algorithms in calibration tests with the same data set 
performed very well with the lowest recall accuracy value of 99%. It appears 
that alternate Markov chain based algorithms perform well when test and train 
data are very similar but when the data set differ as in the user identification 
experiments (E6) then recall accuracy scores do not go above 10% . 
 
The HTM was modified (version 2 HTM2++) in the implementation of the 
sequence termination condition (TC3) of the HTM spatial and temporal poolers 
to account for continuous repeated destinations. The same set of experiments 
was repeated (E7) but this time any repeated destinations that occurred at the 
exact same time were removed from the real network dataset. The reduction 
was applied to all train and test data files and accounted for a total reduction in 
repeated destinations of about 35%. The IOR values decreased and recall 
accuracy increased. For instance, with real network data for 10 users with 5 
train days and 1 test day, IOR decreased  by 7% and  9% for train and test data 
sets respectively while recall accuracy increased  by 8% with the recall 
accuracy values shown in Table 7.  
TABLE 7.  REAL CELLULAR NETWORK DATA RECALL ACCURACY RESULTS (E7) 
Train/Test Days Recall Results from Real Cellular Network using HTM algorithms 
 5 Users 
High 
Recall 
10 Users High 
Recall 
5 Users Low Recall 
10 Users Low 
Recall 
5 Train, 1 Test days 0.95 0.87 0.75 0.64 
5 Train, 2 Test days 0.90 0.79 0.78 0.61 
10 Train, 3 Test days 0.86 0.81 0.72 0.64 
 
To determine if results using 10 users with real network data had 
statistical significance we took the experiment from Table 7 using real network 
data for 10 users for 5 train days and 1 test day. This experiment produced a 
“high” recall accuracy value of 87% (86.7). We repeated the same experiment 
30 times, skipping the first 5, 10, 15, 20,.. up to 150 destinations for each 
experiment. This mimics starting an experiment at a different place in the real 
data stream. The value of α chosen was 0.01, the research hypothesis was that 
the recall accuracy over these experiments was greater than 85.8%. The 
calculated sample standard deviation was 0.0084, the standard error mean was 
0.0015, and the mean was 0.8625, while the z-score was 2.92. These results are 
significant at the 0.0018 level. 
 
Why was HTM1 (the original version of the HTM) unable to recognize 
repetitive continuous patters? HTM1 broke up repetitive patterns instead of 
treating them as sequences. So pattern, 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 was seen as pattern 
1,2,3 occurring 3 times (which is good), but sequence 2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2 was seen 
as a single destination 2 visited 8 times. This means that a user who seldom 
visits destination 2 and another who visits it in a sequence will produce 
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analogous similarity statistics since for a single repeating continuous 
destination, HTM1 does not see a sequence of destinations but only a single 
element. HTM version 2 (HTM2) modifies terminating condition TC3 to 
continue to process repeated destinations already in the sequence until a new 
destination not already in the sequence is encountered or terminating conditions 
TC1 or TC2 are met. In order to understand the recall accuracy improvements 
between experiments E9, E8,and E7, Fig. 11 shows the results for user 
identification tests run with 5 users with 5 train and 2 test days’ worth of real 
data.  HTM1 represents version 1 of the HTMs without the fix to address 
continuous repetitive patterns (E9), HTM2 is the second version of the HTM 
which addresses repetitive continuous patterns but is run on the same real data 
set as HTM1 (E8). HTM2++ is HTM2 run on the real data set where web 
destinations repeated at the exact same time are removed from the input (E7).  
The baseline in Fig. 11 is based on running the experiments on the equivalent 
synthetic data set. The association of higher levels of IOR measurements with 
the inferior accuracy results was further investigated and experiments were run 
(beyond experiments reported in Table 3) with the same data set for 10 users (5 
train days/1 test day), this time completely eliminating repeating continuous 
patterns of a single destination within observations in the input to determine if 
this would further positively impact accuracy results. While IOR continued to 
decrease (additional 8% for both train and test data sets), unexpectedly, 
accuracy never improved beyond 87%.  
 
Figure 11 - Accuracy comparisons of all HTM versions (E7,E8, E9) including removal of same time 
destinations  
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While investigating these results further, the real network data set was run 
through an algorithm that computed and thus measured concept drift by 
converting the concept drift generator for synthetic data to a concept drift 
detector for real network data. This concept drift detector identified changed 
user behavior in the test data set due to visits to new connections among 
existing nodes (CDe ) and new connections to new nodes (CDn)  as shown in 
Table 8. 
 
 
TABLE 8. CONCEPT DRIFT MEASURED IN REAL CELLULAR NETWORK DATA (E7) 
 
Train/Test Days Concept Drift (CD) from Real Network Data 
 5 Users CDe 
existing 
connections 
10 Users CDe 
existing 
connections 
5 Users CDn 
new 
connections 
10 Users CDn 
new connections 
5 Train, 1 Test days 0.19 0.20 0.05 0.07 
5 Train, 2 Test days 0.20 0.21 0.07 0.09 
10 Train, 3 Test days 0.18 0.19 0.07 0.08 
 
The average CDe concept drift is 20% and CDn is 7% which is very similar 
to the simulated concept drift levels used for synthetic data. In order to 
determine the impact of concept drift on recall accuracy for real network data 
experiments, the HTM prototype was further modified to continuously learn 
during inference (E13). Preliminary results, using only the BottomUP approach 
run at HTM layer 3, show that recall accuracy improves with the real network 
data for 5, 10 users for 5 train days and 1, 2, 3 test days. Specifically, recall 
accuracy for 5 users improved on average 4% and 2% for continuous baseline 
and continuous inference respectively and 6% and 1% respectively for 10 users. 
Table 9 shows details of these results. 
 
TABLE 9. RECALL ACCURACY WHEN CONTINUOUS LEARNING IS APPLIED TO REAL NETWORK DATA (E13) 
 
Train/Test 
Days 
Continuous Learning (BottomUp layer3) Recall Results from Real Cellular 
Network 
 5 Users Recall 
Continuous 
Baseline/Normal 
10 Users Recall 
Continuous 
Baseline/Normal 
5 Users Recall 
Continuous 
Inference/Normal 
10 Users Recall 
Continuous 
Inference/Normal 
5 Train, 1 Test 
days 
0.983 /0.95 0.931 /0.87 0.983 /0.95 0.899/0.87 
5 Train, 2 Test 
days 
0.88/0.876 0.847/0.788 0.868/0.876 0.776/0.788 
10 Train, 3 
Test days 
0.847/0.773 0.826/0.764 0.807/0.773 0.766/0.764 
 
Experiments with real network data which simulated DOS attacks (E10) run 
across all HTM algorithms reduced accuracy by up to 8% while experiments 
which simulated Phish attacks (E11) reduced accuracy only by up to 4%. Fig. 12 
shows the results of (E14) using continuous learning to mitigate the user 
attribution effects under a DOS attack. The baseline, “normal” in Fig. 12, 
represents experiments run without continuous learning. The results show that 
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when a subset of users (four out of ten) is under attack during the inference 
phase, it is possible to get improved attribution recognition accuracy (even over 
scenarios where no attacks are present) when the HTM algorithm can learn 
perfectly (continuous baseline). On the other hand, using inference to select 
which sequences to learn during continuous learning (continuous inference) 
produces mixed results. DOS attacks conducted during the inference phase 
produce decreased recognition accuracy performance when continuous 
inference learning is enabled possibly due to the fact that attacked sites were 
already learned by this user before the attack took place and do not create new 
distinctive patterns.  Phish attacks instead produced better recognition accuracy 
performance possibly due to the fact that attacked sites were new and not 
learned until after the attack making it easier to infer them correctly. 
 
 
Figure 12 Recall Accuracy using Continuous Learning during DOS and Phish attacks (E14) 
4.3. Session Identification Experiment Results 
The motivation for  conducting session identification experiments is to 
determine how much different session identification approaches applied during 
HTM training impact the ability of the HTM to infer accurately (when used 
under conditions that emulate real life scenarios specific to each session 
identification algorithm).  
Session Identification experiment results showed that the sliding 
window session identification algorithm (which operates normally with some 
level of randomness) when measured against “perfect” tracking algorithms 
such as source IP address and TCP timestamp (that are exposed to simulated 
real life conditions which introduce noise in the data set) can outperform both 
of these algorithms. The average recall accuracy for all experiments across 5 
and 10 users is shown in Fig. 13. To put things in perspective, a window size of 
1 minute, produced a change in the original train data set (loss of web 
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destinations) of 57%, yet recall accuracy during inference is reported at 92% 
(sliding window worst result), compared to the best performing TCP timestamp 
(with 10% data loss and 10% device resets) which reports average recall 
accuracy value of 83%. These results warrant further study into the impact of 
noise on the session identification algorithms presented in this study. 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Aggregate Session Identification Recall Accuracy Results 
 
5. Security and Privacy Considerations 
This study addresses the important problem of user attribution leveraging 
communication traffic. A relevant property of user attribution as implemented 
in this study is that it is privacy preserving with respect to the real identity of 
the user. Consider the following real-world scenario where the user attribution 
solution described in this paper is deployed in an access network (possibly a 
cellular/WIFI operator network or at internet points of presence) and monitors 
HTTP traffic. As traffic passes through the user attribution solution (UAS) as 
proposed in this paper, the solution learns to recognize users (User 1, User 2, 
User 3, …., User N) based on each user’s past communication behavior. After 
the learning stage, the UAS can recognize users (inference stage) based on 
learned communication patterns when users re-enter the network possibly using 
a new source IP address and new authorization credentials without knowing the 
user specific identity (User1 is Joe Smith). In the context of security, accuracy 
and the (minimal) amount of test data used by HTM algorithms to recognize 
users are the key measures of success for the UAS.  The majority of 
experiments conducted in this study measured recall accuracy; in addition, 
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experiments conducted which leveraged just 3 observations in the test data sets 
provide good insights on how quickly the user attribution solution proposed in 
this study could recognize users. 
There are several applications in the area of security that benefit from being 
able to address the user attribution problem.  Specifically, in the area of 
intrusion detection, the HTM-based approach used to identify users can be used 
before, during or after an attack has taken place to identify the communication 
traffic associated with the user that needs to be stopped or rate limited.  
 
The “user attribution problem” is generic and not tied to attack scenarios, 
but it can still be used to recognize and stop malicious users. Consider a second 
real-world scenario where the UAS is coupled with an intrusion detection and 
prevention system (IDPS) so that both receive the same communication input 
but instead of using the source IP address to recognize users (due to the 
unreliability of this source), the IDPS uses the user labels (User 1, User 2, User 
3…. ,User N) associated with the given input provided by the UAS. The UAS 
after it has completed the training phase and it has entered the inference phase 
provides user labels to the IDPS. Assume the IDPS (out of scope for this study) 
detects anomalous behavior with communication traffic belonging to user4 and 
blocks all HTTP traffic associated with this user label. User4, unable to access 
the internet decides to re-enter the network next day from a different location, 
possibly using a different access network (e.g. WIFI access point instead of a 
cellular network). User4 likely using a brand new assigned IP address is able to 
access the internet, until the UAS recognizes user4 and passes this user label to 
the IDPS which will again block this user before the user can start to perform 
malicious activities.   
 
The experiments run in this study show that it is possible to recognize 
communication traffic as belonging to a given user even during DOS or phish 
attacks originating from mobile devices albeit less effectively.   We are not 
aware of reported DOS attacks that originate from mobile devices. Operators 
do report DOS attacks such as DNS amplification attacks originating from the 
internet destined for IP addresses of mobile devices. Such attacks are typically 
stopped by operators using firewalls deployed at internet peering points and do 
not impact user attribution as defined in this study, since they do not originate 
from mobile devices. Analysis of DOS attack traces made available by the 
operator where real network data was collected show the typical DOS attack 
pattern of extremely high volume of messages, sent within extremely tight time 
windows to the same destination IP address. If such attack patterns were to 
originate from many mobile devices then the UAS could easily filter them out 
(same destinations within the same time stamp) as was done in experiments E7. 
 
What if after an attack occurred, traces of the communication traffic of 
many users were analyzed to tie that traffic to a possible physical human? The 
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UAS could be trained to recognize communication traffic for users and bind 
those users to real humans (user4 is Joe Smith). Like previous examples, the 
UAS relies on inference to attribute communication traffic to a given user and 
thus it suffers from possible false negative or false positive errors as opposed to 
a typical authentication system which relies on fixed tokens like secret 
key/passwords/cookies. However, it is highly unlikely that such tokens are 
present in the communication traffic collected from communication logs/traces 
for user traffic destined to specific web destinations. Even if present, these 
security tokens have meaning only to the end systems that issued them. 
Because of these reasons the HTM-based approach proposed in this study 
could be used to address network forensic investigations.  
What if the described scenarios of intrusion detection and network forensic 
could only have access to encrypted user traffic data? Would the HTM-based 
approach still be able to recognize user communication traffic? Consider the 
following three different scenarios: (1) User communication to a secure 
network server via IPSEC, (2) User communication to a web server supporting 
a secure HTTPS connection, (3) User leveraging the anonymizing Tor network 
[16] to communicate with a web server. The answer to the above questions 
depend on whether the destination IP address in the encrypted communication 
traffic received by the attribution system represents the actual destination that 
the user intended to visit. This is possible with IPSEC since the IPSEC tunnel 
could terminate at the site being visited, it is likely with HTTPS since the 
secure connection terminates at the server being visited, but impossible with 
Tor destined traffic since Tor encrypts the original data, including the 
destination IP address, several times and sends it through a virtual circuit 
comprising successive, randomly selected Tor relays. 
 
What if a strategic attacker, who knows about the attribution system 
being in place, takes actions to avoid it?  The attribution system monitors 
normal traffic and not malicious traffic, assuming that the original user has 
possession of the compromised device, then that user would continue to use the 
device normally, with normal “concept drift” over time, plus the background 
malicious activity. In this case the attribution system has a good chance of 
recognizing the user. However, if the malicious activity completely takes over 
the device (possibly the device is stolen) then the new malicious user will have 
different user behavior and this malicious user would not be recognized by the 
attribution system. 
 
Another security application where user attribution as addressed in this 
study could be leveraged is in the area of user communication traffic 
identification under source spoofing conditions. Assume that spoofing or 
impersonation could take place as two users call or message each other. In this 
case, the sequence of destinations (numbers called or messaged to) originating 
from a potential impersonator are run against HTMs which are trained with 
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sequences of destinations accessed by valid users. These sequences would be 
identified as being spoofed if the HTM inferred user (associated with these 
learned sequences) does not match the reported originating user. For instance, 
assume that for Voice over IP (VOIP) scenarios the HTM at train time 
monitors SIP INVITE messages which identify calls originating from user1. At 
train time the HTM learns that user1 calls <user2, user5, user8> in that order. 
Assume that user1 is being impersonated and the impersonating user1 calls 
<user5, user8, user2>, then this call pattern is not likely to match user1 (the 
reported originating user in the SIP INVITE message) call patterns and thus 
user1 would be identified as a possible impersonator. Note that even if the 
impersonator were to guess the right sequence order of users to call, it is not 
guaranteed that the HTM would be fooled into identifying the impersonating 
user1 as the authentic user1. This is because the HTM learns the inter 
destination arrival rate TC2 for all learned sequences. This means that if the 
HTM learned the following sequence <user2, user5, user8> for user1 and for 
another user4 it learned sequence <user5, user8>, then the impersonating user1 
could call the same users as the original user1 but with different inter arrival 
times so that two sequences could be generated: <user2>, <user5, user8>. In 
this case user4, different from the originating user1 reported in the SIP INVITE 
message, would be identified as matching the input sequences and user1 would 
again be identified as an impersonator. Session identification, however, would 
likely leverage a different identification approach for the VOIP scenarios than 
what has been proposed in this study. Assuming that the train data set is trusted, 
the originating user is identified in the SIP INVITE message (“FROM/Contact” 
SIP headers) and this tracking header can be used to create user sessions, 
instead of using the TCP timestamps. This session identification approach 
works especially well when SIP INVITE messages ride over the UDP protocol 
which cannot use the TCP timestamp. 
6. Limitations 
The following sections describe implementation constraints faced during the 
experimentation phase as well as envisioned challenges faced using the TCP 
timestamp approach. 
6.1. Limitations in Implementation 
The HTM prototype was completely written in Java. The performance 
scalability of HTMs measured in terms of run-time and space (memory needed 
at run-time) was a challenge in this study which limited the experiments to a 
maximum of 500 users. All experiments were executed on a Quad i7-3820QM 
2.7-3.7 GHz with 16Gig RAM laptop. Threading (one thread per HTM) and 
caching (of already computed results derived by performing inference traversal 
of the Markov chains within each layer of the HTM) were two techniques that 
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considerably improved the inference performance of the HTM allowing 
completing the experiments for 500 users in reasonable times. When first 
implemented threads improved run-time performance by almost 100% so that 
running the HTM algorithms for 2 users would take about 30 minutes to 
complete in single threaded mode but using multiple threads the experiment 
would complete in 16 minutes. By adding caching of results of Markov chain 
searches, performance dropped from 16 minutes to 6 minutes for the same set 
of experiments. Further optimizations in how threads were used (limiting the 
number of concurrent threads to 8) and other enhancements in the cache 
algorithms to maximize cache hits and minimize collisions resulted in run 
times of 16 minutes to 1 hour and 15 minutes for 5 to 100 users using 5 days’ 
worth of synthetic train data and 1 day worth of test data and 7 minutes to 5 
hours for 5 to 500 users for 5000 destinations using 5 days’ worth of synthetic 
train data and 3 observations worth of test data. In contrast, the highest run time 
for alternate Markov chain based algorithms was 3 minutes for equivalent tests 
which involved 500 users. Alternate Markov chains algorithms have much 
better run times since discovery of the start of the input sequence is determined 
in constant time and matching of the sequence against the “context” occurs in 
time proportional to the size of the input since all alternate Markov chain 
algorithms are based on extensions of a 1st order Markov graph which matches 
the input completely based on the on the very first web destination in the 
sequence. HTM algorithms on the other hand have search run times that are 
proportional to the size of the entire input (all sequences) learned at training 
time as well as the size of the input sequence since HTMs perform an 
exhaustive search of all Markov chains at each HTM layer.  
The amount of runtime memory needed by HTMs also proved to be a 
limiting factor in being able to extend experiments beyond 500 users. The 
HTM was run with a JVM setting of 14 gigabytes of RAM but a limiting factor 
of the HTM design is the need for the MAX HTM Output layer (as shown in 
Fig. 8) to receive and hold one observation’s worth of feed forward beliefs 
from each HTM before being able to decide which HTM has the “best” feed 
forward belief. Increasing the number of users increases the number of HTMs 
which also increases the amount of RAM main memory needed to run the 
experiment.  When the Java JVM starts to run out of the allocated RAM 
memory and starts to use hard drive virtual memory, run-time performance 
deteriorates dramatically eventually preventing forward progress. 
 
6.2. Limitations in Approach 
There are a few limitations tied to the use of TCP timestamps as a 
communication session identification algorithm. In this study, the TCP 
timestamp session identification is used in two situations. The first occurs 
during training of an HTM when session identification is used to identify up to 
50 observations as belonging to a given source associated with a specific HTM 
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representing a given user. The second occurs during inference when session 
identification is used to create anonymous sessions for each observation which 
are distributed to all HTMs so that each HTM can perform inference on the 
observation to determine how well the observation matches learned input for 
each HTM. During the training phase the following scenarios are not allowed 
as they will corrupt the training data set:  
 A single user leveraging multiple devices 
 Many users sharing the same device 
 The user recycling the device.  
A single user using multiple devices at training time would appear as many 
different sources and thus one HTM would be created for each source. This is a 
problem because each HTM created at train time identifies a different user 
when actually training is occurring for only one user. When many users share 
the same device at train time, the sessions produced are corrupted. These 
sessions will include data from multiple users and would thus not be 
representative of any given user. When a user recycles his/her device, the TCP 
timestamp is reset and this user session will appear as a new source and thus 
would incorrectly cause a new HTM to be created, thus identifying a new, non-
existing user. During the inference phase when anonymous sessions are created 
only the second scenario is disallowed as the multiple users sharing the same 
device will create individual sessions with corrupted data belonging to multiple 
users.  During the inference phase a user can use one device to train the HTM 
and a different device to perform inference. In addition, during inference, when 
anonymous sessions are created, the device under test can be recycled, as long 
as partial sessions (containing less than 50 observations) produced because 
recycling interrupts creation of the previous observation, are discarded. In 
general, the effect of a recycling device is the restart of a TCP IP connection 
which resets the TCP timestamp’s TS value. TCP connections are also reset 
when TCP connections go through middle boxes (Web proxies, NATs, 
Firewalls, Load Balancers) which split a single TCP connection from device to 
origin server into two TCP connections; one connection from the device to the 
middle box and the other from the middle box to the origin server. 
 
If the TCP approach has the reported limitations why was this approach 
chosen for this study? The TCP timestamp approach provides a reliable way to 
“track” user communication sessions in a way that is independent of the 
location or network a device attaches to, thus enabling support for mobility. 
The authors believe that in real life scenarios, users recycle their mobile 
devices infrequently, and do not share their personal mobile devices with others. 
Another practical challenge with the use of TCP timestamp is due to the 
possibility of loss of tracking accuracy due to clock skew, approaches to 
address these challenges were presented in the “Session Identification” section. 
A final limitation brought to bear in this study is found in experiments (E14) 
where DOS attacks during user identification experiments are countered by 
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using “continuous learning”. The results show consistent worse recall accuracy 
performance when using continuous inference learning.  This leads to the 
observation that continuous learning can improve user identification recall 
accuracy in the presence of “concept drift” but when presented with repeated 
continuous patters found in typical DOS attacks, it can perform poorly. 
 
6.3. Further Research Directions 
An assumption made in this study is that users can be identified by learning 
web sites they visit. An interesting extension of this idea would be to study the 
user attribution problem in the context of peer-to-peer communication as is the 
case for messaging and voice calls. A key question would be: Can users be 
identified based on peer-to-peer patterns of communication? A related question 
would be: Is the power law at work in peer-to-peer communication scenarios as 
well? That is, do people tend to communicate (message or call) with a few set 
of users very often and with many other users infrequently? The security 
implications of extending the user attribution problem to cover peer-to-peer 
communication scenarios are especially relevant in the area of detection of 
spoofing of sources in peer-to-peer communication (e.g. recently RFC 7375 
“Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model” has defined voice attacks where the 
calling party can be impersonated by an attacker).  
As mobility will continue to dominate our future and as the internet of 
people becomes the internet of things, the user attribution problem will 
eventually morph into a device/user attribution problem. It would be interesting 
to run experiments that utilize all communication traffic originating from a 
device, not just HTTP traffic, to extend the attribution problem from a user to a 
source (device/user).  
Due to the promising results achieved in this study it is important to 
extend experiments that seek to improve recall accuracy utilizing a larger real-
network data set studying further the impact on user identification accuracy of 
techniques like continuous learning. The HTM framework will be made 
available to researchers who wish to extend this work by contacting the authors. 
7. Conclusions 
The user attribution problem is an old problem that just recently has 
received the attention of the research community. This problem  is very 
important in the field of security since if one cannot attribute communication 
traffic to a specific user in a network then one cannot identify the user to 
determine if that user is performing malicious activities in that network or even 
more importantly stop/prevent the user from continuing to perform such 
activity.  This is the first study that addresses the user attribution problem in the 
context of complex networks where mobility is dominant using an extensive set 
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of experiments which used both synthetic and real network data. The approach 
leveraged behavior based identification using HTMs to extend the research of 
Herrmann and Yang [25, 46]. This research, acknowledges the limitations of 
traditional tracking identifiers such as cookies and source IP addresses, and 
introduces TCP timestamps as a new session identification algorithm used to 
identify communication sessions for mobile users. Results from the 
experiments conducted in this study are promising. HTMs outperform 
traditional Markov chains based approaches and can provide high levels of 
identification accuracy using synthetic data with 99% recall accuracy for up to 
500 users and good levels of recall accuracy of 95 % and 87% for 5 and 10 
users respectively when using cellular network data. Performance was further 
improved with recall accuracy results of 98% and 90% for 5 and 10 users 
respectively by implementing continuous learning enabled during inference 
within HTMs to address the challenge of concept drift found in real cellular 
networks. 
This research has made several contributions in the approach used by 
extending the hierarchical temporal memory model originally proposed in [19] 
which was not designed to support sequences and showed that sequence based 
hierarchical memories can consistently provide higher levels of identification 
accuracy with higher levels of accuracy scalability than traditional Markov 
chains. The following represent contributions from this research designed to 
improve HTM inference accuracy:  
 This study implements sequence inference using a novel technique 
which combines traditional variable order Markov chains with the use 
of longest common subsequence and longest common substring 
coupled with the persistence of learned sequences to support seven new 
HTM inference algorithms. 
  This study introduces the concept of sequence cloning to improve the 
learning and inference accuracy of Markov chains and of HTMs.  
 This study introduces the concept of playback to distribute accurately 
learned sequences from lower to higher layers of the HTM. This 
reduces learning times and improves inference accuracy in hierarchical 
models like HTMs. 
 
This study also provides insights into the impact to recall accuracy of 
the power law distribution at work in complex networks which creates high 
levels repetition of popular web sites in the data set. The impact to recall 
accuracy of noise in the data set was studied in the context of simulation of 
malicious activities and the simulation and observation of context drift in a real 
network. Experiment results suggest that while partial elimination from the 
data set of continuous repetition of popular web sites improves accuracy results, 
complete elimination of such repetition does not produce further improvements. 
Instead, addressing concept drift found in real networks shows promise as an 
area of further research for improving attribution accuracy performance.  
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9. Appendix A – Example of HTM creation during the Training Phase 
The examples in this section and in Appendix B assume that 
contiguous repetitive sequences (e.g. <48,48,48,48>) are treated as multiple 
sequences of size 1 based on terminating condition TC3 (e.g. 
<48>,<48>,<48>,<48>) which reflects the implementation in version 1 of the 
HTM (HTM1 in experiments E9 found in Table 3).  
In order to get a better idea of how beliefs propagate up the HTM 
network layers, this section of the paper shows what happens during playback 
of input learned in layer 1 of the HTM as represented in the Markov graph and 
Markov chains shown in Fig.14 in Appendix B. Input received at layer 1 by the 
spatial pooler is organized into sequences with the temporal pooler computing 
corresponding feed forward beliefs as shown in Table 10. Note that during 
playback the feed forward belief vector only indicates the matched temporal 
group (in contrast with the inference phase where feed forward beliefs also 
record the degree of membership value). 
 
Table 10 Learned Input Sequences at HTM Layer 1 with generated FFBs 
Sequences Learned Feed Forward Beliefs 
λ<g1,g2,g3,g4,g5,g6> 
S1,S2,S3,S4 λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0> 
S1,S2,S5 λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0> 
S1,S3,S6 λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0> 
S1,S3,S6 λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0> 
T1,T2,T3 λ<0,0,0,0,g5,0> 
T1,T3,T5 λ<0,0,0,0,g5,0> 
T6,T5,T7 λ<0,0,0,0,0,g6> 
S3,S7,S6,S1 λ<0,0,g3,0,0,0> 
H-L1,H-L2 λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> 
H-L1 λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> 
H-L1,H-L3 λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> 
H-L1 λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> 
H-L1, H-L2, H-L3 λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> 
  UL1, UL2, UL3, UL4 λ<0,0,0,g4,0,0> 
S2,S6,S5 λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0> 
S1,S8,S6 λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0> 
 
After layer 1 completes initial training, layer 1 starts playback of 
learned sequences towards layer 2. The spatial pooler at layer 2 maps feed 
forward beliefs from layer 1 into sequence of coincidences using the sequence 
termination rules TC1-3 previously described to combine input into sequences as 
shown in Table 11. 
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Table 11 HTM Layer 2 learned Coincidences 
Feed Forward Beliefs 
from Layer 1 
Coincidences Sequences of Coincidences for 
Layer2 
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0> g2  C1 (new 
coincidence) 
C1 
λ<0, g2,0,0,0,0> C1 C1 
λ<0, g2,0,0,0,0> C1 C1 
λ<0, g2,0,0,0,0> C1  
λ<0,0,0,0,g5,0> g5 C2 (new 
coincidence) 
C1, C2 
λ<0,0,0,0,g5,0> C2  
λ<0,0,0,0,0,g6> g6  C3 (new 
coincidence) 
 
λ<0,0,g3,0,0,0> g3  C4 (new 
coincidence) 
 
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> g1  C5 (new 
coincidence) 
C2, C3, C4, C5 
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> C5 C5 
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> C5 C5 
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> C5 C5 
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0> C5  
λ<0,0,0,g4,0,0> g4  C6 (new 
coincidence) 
 
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0> C1 C5, C6, C1 
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0> C1 C1 
 
Having completed initial learning, layer 2 then would convert the 
received coincidences into the Markov Graph and Markov chains as shown 
below in Fig. 15. Assuming that initial learning is completed at layer 2, layer 2 
starts playback in order to train layer 3 as shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 Learned Input Sequences at HTM Layer 2 with generated FFBs 
Sequences Learned Feed Forward Beliefs 
λ<g1,g2,g3> 
C1 λ<g1,0,0> 
C1 λ<g1,0,0> 
C1 λ<g1,0,0> 
C1 C2 λ<g1,0,0> 
C2, C3, C4, C5 λ<0,g2,0> 
C5 λ<0,g2,0> 
C5 λ<0,g2,0> 
C5 λ<0,g2,0> 
C5, C6, C1 λ<0,0,g3> 
C1 λ<g1,0,0> 
 
Finally, the spatial pooler at layer 3 converts feed forward beliefs 
received from layer 2 into sequence of coincidences using the terminating 
condition rules previously described to combine coincidences into sequences of 
coincidences as shown in Table 13.  Fig. 16 shows layer 3 Markov chains. 
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Table 13 HTM Layer 3 Learned Coincidences 
Feed Forward 
Beliefs 
Coincidences Sequences of Coincidences for 
Layer3 
λ<g1,0,0> g1  C1 new 
coincidence 
C1 
λ< g1,0,0> C1 C1 
λ<g1,0,0> C1 C1 
λ< g1,0,0> C1  
λ<0, g2,0> g2  C2 new 
coincidence 
C1, C2 
λ<0,g2,0> C2 C2 
λ<0,g2,0> C2 C2 
λ<0,g2,0> C2  
λ<0,0,g3> g3  C3 new 
coincidence 
C2, C3 
λ< g1,0,0> C1 C1 
10. Appendix B – Examples of HTM Inference calculations and FFBs propagation 
In order to understand how feed forward beliefs propagate through HTM 
layers during inference consider the following example. Fig.14 represents 
Markov chains at layer 1 of the HTM created  during the training phase based 
on the following input sequences (see Table 10 in Appendix A) received in this 
order during inference: <S1,S2,S3,S4>, < S1,S2,S5>, < S1,S3,S6>, < 
S1,S3,S6>, < T1,T2,T3>, < T1,T3,T5>, < T6,T5,T7>, < S3,S7,S6,S1>, < H-
L1,H-L2>, < H-L1>, <H-L1,H-L3>, < H-L1>, < H-L1, H-L2, H-L3>, < UL1, 
UL2, UL3, UL4>, < S2,S6,S5>, <S1,S6,S8>. These sequences were collected 
by the spatial pooler based on the sequence terminating conditions TC1-3 (for 
this example the max allowed sequence size is 4) previously defined. During 
the learning phase a single Markov graph is created which is then split into 
multiple Markov chains based on the algorithm shown in Fig.6. 
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Figure 14 Example HTM Layer 1 Markov Chains 
 
Assume that during the inference stage the following input sequences 
are processed in time order by layer 1 of the HTM: <S1,S3>, <S3,S6>, 
<T1,T2,T3>, <T6,T9>, <S7,S1>, <HL1,HL2,HL3>, <UL1, UL2, UL4>, 
<UL1,UL3>, <S1, S2>, <S1>. Table 14 was created from these inputs based on 
the FFB calculations from Table 1 applied against the Markov chains in Fig.14. 
Also assume that the HTM algorithm used is neither the Path probability nor 
the ButtomUP algorithm. 
 
Table 14 Feed Forward Belief calculations for HTM Layer 1 
Input Sequence(IS) 
to HTM Layer 1 
Sequence 
Similarity 
(SS) 
Sequence 
Persistence 
(SP) 
Degree of 
Membership 
(DM) 
λL2 Markov 
Chain 
Matched 
<S1,S3> 0.99 0.00125 0.99 <0,0.99,0,0,0,0> g2 
<S3,S6> 0.66 0.00125 0.66 <0,0.66,0,0,0,0> g2 
<T1,T2,T3> 0.99 0.000625 0.99 <0,0,0,0,0.99,0> g5 
<T6,T9> 0.33 0.000625 0.33 <0,0,0,0,0,0.33> g6 
<S7,S1> 0.37 0.000625 0.37 <0,0,0.37,0,0,0> g3 
<HL1,HL2,HL3> 0.99 0.000625 0.99 <0.99,0,0,0,0,0> g1 
<UL1, UL3, UL4> 0.62 0.000625 0.62 <0,0,0,0.62,0,0> g4 
<UL1,UL3> 0.37 0.000625 0.37 <0,0,0,0.37,0,0> g4 
<S1, S2> 0.99 0.000625 0.99 <0,0.99,0,0,0,0> g2 
<S1> 0.99 0.00125 0.99 <0,0.99,0,0,0,0> g2 
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The calculations below refer to Table 14 as applied at HTM layer 1 to 
the Markov chains in Fig.14. 
 IS = <S1,S3>  then LLS = <S1,S3,S6>, SS = (1×0.495) + (1×0.495) = 0.99, 
SP = (2/16 × 0.01), DM=SS=.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1,0.991) = 0.99 
 IS = <S3,S6>   then LLS = <S1,S3,S6>, SS = (2/3 × 0.495) + (2/3 × 0.495) 
=0.66, SP = (2/16 × 0.01), DM = SS=0.66, λL2 = FFB = min(1,0.661) = 0.66 
 IS = <T1,T2,T3> then LLS = <T1,T2,T3>,  SS = (1×0.495) + (1 × 0.495) = 
0.99, SP = (1/16× 0.01), DM= SS=0.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1, 0.991) = 0.99 
 IS = <T6,T9> then LLS = <T6,T5,T7>, SS=(1/3 × 0.495) + (1/3 × 0.495) = 
0.33, SP = (1/16× 0.01), DM=SS=0.33, λL2 = FFB = min(1, 0.331) = 0.33 
 IS = <S7,S1> then LLS = <S3,S7,S6,S1>, SS= (2/4 × 0.495) + (1/4 × 0.495)= 
0.37, SP = (1/16× 0.01), DM=SS=0.37, λL2 = FFB = min(1, 0.371) = 0.37 
 IS = <HL1,HL2,HL3> then LLS = <HL1,HL2,HL3>, SS= (3/3 × 0.495) + 
(3/3 × 0.495) = 0.99, SP = (1/16× 0.01), DM=SS=0.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1, 
0.991) = 0.99 
 IS = <UL1, UL3, UL4> then LLS = <UL1, UL2, UL3,UL4>, SS= (3/4 × 
0.495) + (2/4 × 0.495) = 0.617, SP = (1/16 × 0.01), DM = SS=0.617 , λL2 = 
FFB = min(1,0.6176 ) = 0.62 
 IS = <UL1,UL3> then LLS= <UL1, UL2, UL3,UL4>, SS= (2/4 × 0.495) + 
(1/4 × 0.495) = 0.37, SP = (1/16 × 0.01), DM = SS=0.37, λL2 = FFB = 
min(1,0.371) = 0.37 
 IS = <S1, S2> then LLS = <S1,S2,S5>, SS= (2/2 × 0.495) + (1/2 × 0.495) = 
0.99, SP = (1/16 × 0.01), DM = SS=0.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1,0.991)  =  0.99 
 IS = <S1> then LLS = <S1,S3,S6>, SS= (1/1 × 0.495) + (1/1 × 0.495) = 0.99, 
SP = (2/16 × 0.01), DM =(SS,SP)=0.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1,0.991)  =  0.99 
 
 
The feed forward beliefs from layer 1 travel to layer 2 as shown in 
Table 15 below. The mapping of temporal groups gi to coincidences Ci was 
established during the learn phase and is shown in Table 11 in Appendix A. 
Layer 2 input sequences (coincidences) are created based on terminating 
conditions TC1 and TC3. 
 
 
Table 15 HTM Layer 2 Mapping of Feed Forward Beliefs to Coincidences 
λL2 
λ<g1,g2,g3,g4,g5,g6> 
Maps to 
Layer 2 
Coincidence 
Layer 2 
Input 
Sequence 
(IS) 
Sgi Layer1 
FFBgi 
from λL2 
Layer 2 
IALSgi..i..i+N 
<0,0.99,0,0,0,0> g2 C1 < C1> Sg2 0.99 0.99 
<0,0.66,0,0,0,0> C1   0.66  
<0,0,0,0,0.99,0> g5  C2   0.99  
<0,0,0,0,0,0.33> g6  C3   0.33  
<0,0,0.37,0,0,0> g3  C4 < C1, C2, C3, 
C4> 
Sg2563 0.37 0.5875 
<0.99,0,0,0,0,0> g1  C5   0.99  
<0,0,0,0.62,0,0> g4  C6 < C5, C6> Sg14 0.62 0.805 
<0,0,0,0.37,0,0> C6   0.37  
<0,0.99,0,0,0,0> g2 C1 < C6, C1> Sg42 0.99 0.68 
<0,0.99,0,0,0,0> C2 < C2> Sg2 0.99 0.99 
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The HTM layer 2 input activation level (IAL) calculations from Table 
15 are shown below: 
 IALSg2 = 0.99/1 = 0.99 
 IALSg2563 = [0.66 + 0.99 + 0.33 + 0.37]/4 = 0.5875 
 IALSg14 = [0.99 + 0.62]/2 = 0.805 
 IALSg42 = [0.37 + 0.99]/2 = 0.68 
 IALSg2 = 0.99/1 = 0.99 
Layer 2 of the HTM was created during the training phase (see Table 11 in 
Appendix A) and is shown below. 
 
 
Figure 15 Example HTM Layer 2 Markov Chains 
 
The feed forward beliefs generated at layer 2 to be sent to layer 3 are 
computed as shown in Table 16. 
 
 
Table 16 Feed Forward Belief calculations for HTM Layer 2 
Input Sequence(IS) 
to HTM Layer 2 
Sequence 
Similarity 
(SS) 
Sequence 
Persistence 
(SP) 
Degree of 
Membership 
(DM) 
λL3 Markov 
Chain 
Matched 
< C1> 0.99 0.004 0.99 <0.98,0,0> g1 
< C1, C2, C3, C4> 0.74 0.001 0.74 <0,0.43,0> g2 
< C5, C6> 0.99 0.001 0.99 <0,0,0.80> g3 
< C6, C1> 0.66 0.001 0.66 <0,0,0.45> g3 
< C2> 0.99 0.001 0.99 <0,0.98,0> g2 
 
Table 16 above was created based on the following calculations applied against 
the Markov chains in Fig.15: 
 IS = <C1>  then LLS = <C1>, SS = (1×0.495) + (1×0.495) = 0.99, SP = (4/10 
× 0.01), DM=SS=0.99, λL3 =  FFB  ×  IAL = min(1,0.994) × 0.99  = 0.98 
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 IS = <C1,C2,C3,C4>  then LLS = <C2,C3,C4,C5>, SS = (3/4 × 0.495) + 
(3/4×0.495) = 0.74, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=SS=0.74, λL3 =  FFB  ×  IAL = 
min(1,0.741) × 0.5875  = 0.435 
 IS = <C5,C6>  then LLS = <C5,C6,C1>, SS = (2/2 × 0.495) + (2/2 × 0.495) = 
0.99, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=SS=0.99, λL3 =  FFB  ×  IAL = min(1,0.991) × 
0.805  = 0.796 
 IS = <C6,C1>  then LLS = <C5,C6,C1>, SS = (2/3 × 0.495) + (2/3 × 0.495) = 
0.66, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=SS=0.66, λL3 =  FFB  ×  IAL = min(1,0.661) × 
0.68  = 0.449 
 IS = <C2>  then LLS = < C2,C3,C4,C5>, SS = (1 × 0.495) + (1 × 0.495) = 
0.99, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=SS=0.99, λL3 =  FFB  ×  IAL = min(1,0.991) × 
0.99  = 0.98 
 
 
Layer 3 of the HTM was created during the training phase and is shown below. 
 
Figure 16 HTM Layer 3 Markov Chains 
The feed forward beliefs from layer 2 travel to layer 3 as shown in the 
Table 17 below. The mapping of temporal groups gj to coincidences Cj was 
established during the training phase and is shown in Table 13 in Appendix A. 
 
Table 17 HTM Layer 3 Mapping of Feed Forward Beliefs to Coincidences 
λL3 
λ<g1,g2,g3> 
Maps to 
Layer 3 
Coincidence 
Layer 3 
Input 
Sequence 
(IS) 
Sgj Layer 2 
(FFBgi × 
IALSgi..i..i+N ) 
from λL3 
Layer 3 
IALSgj..j+N 
<0.98,0,0> g1 C1 C1  0.98  
<0,0.43,0> g2 C2 C2  0.43  
<0,0,0.80> g3 C3 < C1, C2,C3> Sg123 0.80 0.737 
<0,0,0.45> g3 C3 C3  0.45  
<0,0.98,0> g2 C2 < C3, C2> Sg23 0.98 0.715 
 
The HTM layer 3 input activation level (IAL) calculations from Table 
17 are shown below: 
 IALSg123 = [0.98 × 0.43 × 0.80]/3 = 0.737 
 IALSg23 = [0.45 + 0.98]/2 = 0.715 
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The feed forward beliefs generated at layer 3 to be sent to the Max Output layer 
are computed as shown below. 
 
 
Table 18 Feed Forward Belief calculations for HTM Layer 3 
Input Sequence(IS) 
to HTM Layer 3 
Sequence 
Similarity 
(SS) 
Sequence 
Persistence 
(SP) 
Degree of 
Membership 
(DM) 
λOutput Markov 
Chain 
Matched 
< C1, C2,C3> 0.66 0.001 0.66 0.49 g1,g2 
< C3, C2> 0.495 0.002 0.495 0.355 g1 
 
The calculations below belong to table 18 based on the Makov chains 
of  HTM layer 3 in Fig.16. 
 
 IS = <C1,C2,C3>  then LLS = <C1,C2> and <C2,C3> since DM(C1,C2) = 
DM(C2,C3) and SP(C1,C2) =  SP(C2,C3), SS = (2/3×0.495) + (2/3×0.495) = 
0.66, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=(SS,SP)=0.66, λOutput =  FFB  ×  IAL = 
min(1,0.661) × 0.737  = 0.49 
 IS = <C3,C2>  then LLS = <C2> since DM(C2) = DM(C1,C2) = DM(C2,C3) 
and SP(C2) > SP(C1,C2) and SP(C2,C3), SS = (1/2×0.495) + (1/2×0.495) = 
0.495, SP = (2/10 × 0.01), DM=(SS,SP)=0.495 , λOutput =  FFB  ×  IAL = 
min(1,0.497) × 0.715  = 0.355 
 
At layer 3 λOutput is sent directly to the Max Output layer, but for layers 
1 and 2 the matched Markov chain is used as an index into vectors λ2 and λ3. 
Since it is possible to match more than one Markov chain as shown for input 
sequence <C1, C2, C3> the single chosen Markov chain is non-deterministic 
(HTM implementation dependent).  
11. Appendix C – Example of Longest Common Subsequence Computation 
Consider the following examples to illustrate the use of formulas (1) LCSm and 
(2) LCSUm 
 
1. Let IS = <a,b,c> and  let  cLLS = <a,b,c,d,x> then   
a. LCS(IS,cLLS) = <a,b,c>,  IS1 = <a>, cLLS1 = <a>, |IS| = 3, |cLLS| = 
5,  ALLL(IS,cLLS) = |IS| = 3, |LCS(IS,cLLS)| = 3   
b. LCSm(IS,cLLS)  = 3/3,  LCSu(IS,cLLS) = <a,b,c>,| LCSu(IS,cLLS) | 
= 3, LCSUm = 3/3 
2. Let IS = <a,m,c> and  let  cLLS = <a,b,c,d,x> then   
a. LCS(IS,cLLS) = <a,c>,  IS1 = <a>, cLLS1 = <a>, |IS| = 3, |cLLS| = 5,  
ALLL(IS,cLLS) = max(IS,cLLS) = 5, |LCS(IS,cLLS)| = 2 
b. LCSm(IS,cLLS)  = 2/5,  LCSu(IS,cLLS) = <a> and <c>, | LCSu| = 1, 
LCSUm = 1/5 
3. Let IS = <b,c> and  let  cLLS = <a,b,c,d,x> then   
a. LCS(IS,cLLS) = <b,c>,  IS1 = <b>, cLLS1 = <a>, |IS| = 2, |cLLS| = 5,  
ALLL(IS,cLLS) = max(IS,cLLS) = 5, |LCS(IS,cLLS)| = 2   
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b. LCSm(IS,cLLS)  = 2/5,  LCSu(IS,cLLS) = <bc> , | LCSu| = 2, LCSUm 
= 2/5 
The best match is achieved with example (1) since all of the input sequence 
is matched against the learned sequence.  The next best match is example (3) 
which matches all of the input but not from the beginning of the learned 
sequence. The worst match is example (2) which matches part of the input, 
albeit from the beginning of the learned sequence. 
12. Appendix D – Computing Path Probability 
Assume that each element of sequence LLS has its path probability 
computed according to equations (11, 12) and probability values stored in table 
Learned_LLS_Nodes, as shown in Fig.17. Then ComputePathProbability 
computes the path probability of IS based on sequence LLS as shown in Fig.17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Path Probability Algorithm 
 
      For instance, assume IS = <S1, S3, S4> then from Fig.14 LLS = <S1,S3,S6> 
then 
P(LLS1)  = P(LLS start →S1) = 4/16 since LLS1 == IS1   from (11) 
P(LLS2) = P(LL S1→S3) = P(LLS2| LLS1)=  2/4  
                 since LLS2 == IS2 from condition (12.a) 
P(LLS3)  = penalty = 0.0001 since LLS3 ≠ IS3 from condition (12.b) 
ComputePathProbability(input, Learned_LLS_Nodes) 
// Compute the path probability of the input from the LLS applying appropriate penalties 
//for  mismatches as follows: 
   Path_prob = 1.0 
   For each element “e” of the input (IS) Do 
      IF match is found between “e” and learned_LLS_Nodes[i] at the next matched  
         consecutive position “i” in sequence LLS 
       THEN  // Condition (12.a) 
- Path_prob = Path_prob * learned_LLS_Nodes[i].probability 
 Else IF “e” does not match any elements in learned_LLS_Nodes from position i  OR “e”  
               matches an already matched element of  learned_LLS_Nodes  
        THEN // Condition (12.b) 
             // Penalize this input element 
 Path_prob = Path_prob * PENALTY 
          ELSE IF a match is found between “e” and learned_LLS_Nodes[j] not at the next  
                     matched consecutive position 
           THEN  // Condition (12.c) 
       // Elements exist in the learned LLS at a position “j” beyond elements at  
       //  position “i” (last matched element) in the learned LLS that are not part of  
       //  the input  Penalize them  
- Path_prob = Path_prob * learned_LLS_Nodes[i].probability * (j - i ) 
* PENALTY 
EndIF  
            EnDo 
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P(LLS) = 4/16 × 2/4 × 0.0001 
 
Another example consider IS = <S1,S4> and assume that  LLS = 
<S1,S2,S3,S4> then  
 P(LLS1)  = P(LLS start →S1)  = 4/16 since LLS1 == IS1   from (11) 
 P(LLS2) = P(LLS3) = penalty = (0.0001 × 2)  
                        since IS2 == LLS4 from condition (12.c)  
 P(LLS)   = 4/16 × (0.0001 × 2) 
 
Another example consider IS = <H1,H4,H5,H2> then from Fig.14 LLS 
=<H1,H2>  then  
 P(LLS1)  = P(LLS start →H1)  = 5/16 since LSS1 == IS1   from (11) 
 P(LLS2)  = penalty = 0.0001 since IS2 ≠ LLS2 from condition (12.b) 
 P(LLS3)  = penalty = 0.0001 since IS3 ≠ LLS2 from condition (12.b) 
 P(LLS4)  = P(LLS H1→H2)  = 2/5 since IS4 == LLS2 from condition (12.a) 
 P(LLS)   = 4/16 × 0.0001 × 0.0001 × 2/5 
 
The first example produces the best match. The second example produces 
the second best match and the third example the worst match. Compare these 
results to utilization of longest common sequence and longest common 
substring calculations and the results are different. When using equations feed 
forward belief calculations 1 and 2, the second example produces the best 
match while the first example produces the second best result and the third 
example produces the worst result. Equations 1 and 2 reward matching all 
elements of the input sequence IS, whereas the probability based computations 
are more sensitive to any mismatch between input and learned sequence. 
Another way to look at it, is that longest common based algorithms of 
similarity match the input more “loosely” than probability based algorithms. 
13. Appendix E – Understanding HTM Algorithms 
To understand how HTM algorithms work consider the following 
example where input to the Max Output layer is generated during inference for 
two HTMs (HTMA, HTMB, see Table 19) from the same observation (made up 
of several input sequences totaling 50 web destinations). 
Table 19 Feed Forward Beliefs with associated input received at Max Output Layer 
HTMA λOutputK HTMA matched 
input sequence (ISk) 
size 
HTMB  λOutputK HTMB matched 
input sequence (ISk) 
0.45 1 0.99 5 
0.76 5 0.35 4 
0.22 5 0.65 3 
0.35 3 0.78 5 
0.44 2 0.44 4 
0.77 5 0.96 5 
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0.85 4 0.84 4 
0.31 5 0.47 4 
0.56 5 0.24 3 
0.30 5 0.67 3 
0.66 3 0.52 5 
0.94 2 0.72 5 
0.29 5   
 
 Average HTMA = (0.45 + 0.76 + 0.22 + 0.35 + 0.44 + 0.77 + 0.85 + 0.31 + 
0.56 + 0.30 + 0.66 + 0.94 + 0.29)/50 = 6.9/50=0.138 
 Average HTMB = (0.99 + 0.35 + 0.65 + 0.78 + 0.44 + 0.96 + 0.84 + 0.47 + 
0.24  + 0.67 + 0.52 + 0.72)/50 = 7.63/50= 0.1526 
 Weighted Ave HTMA = [0.45×(1/50)] + [0.76× (5/50)] + [0.22 × (5/50)] + 
[0.35 × (3/50)] + [0.44 × (2/50)] + [0.77 × (5/50)] + [0.85 × (4/50)] + [0.31 × 
(5/50)] + [0.56 × (5/50)] + [0.30 × (5/50)] + [0.66 × (3/50)] + [0.94 × (2/50)] + 
[0.29× (5/50)] = 0.5138 
 Weighted Ave HTMB = [0.99 ×(5/50)] + [0.35 × (4/50)] + [0.65 × (3/50)] + 
[0.78 × (5/50)] + [0.44 × (4/50)] + [0.96 × (5/50)] + [0.84 × (4/50)] + [0.47 × 
(4/50)] + [0.24  × (3/50)] + [0.67 × (3/50)] + [0.52 × (5/50)] + [0.72× (5/50)] = 
0.6586 
 Path Prob HTMA = 0.45 × 0.76 × 0.22 × 0.35 × 0.44 × 0.77 × 0.85 × 0.31 × 
0.56 × 0.30 × 0.66 × 0.94 × 0.29 = 0.000071 
 Path Prob HTMB = 0.99 × 0.35 × 0.65 × 0.78 × 0.44 × 0.96 × 0.84 × 0.47 × 
0.24  × 0.67 × 0.52 ×0.72 = 0.00176 
For this example, for all HTM algorithms, the observation matches 
sequences learned by HTMB better than sequences learned by HTMA since 
HTMB = max HTMA,B(Average()) = max HTMA,B(Weighted Sum()) = max 
HTMA,B(Path Probability()) (see eq. 17). 
14. Appendix F - The Design of Synthetic Data 
Synthetic train and test data was produced for both the HTM and 
Markov Chain (MC) based algorithms. The User Attribution solution was 
verified against synthetic data that mimics user web visits found in real world 
scenarios as shown in Fig. 18, using the algorithm presented in Fig.19. The 
User Attribution solution was also verified against MC approaches. These 
approaches, as opposed to the HTM, do not leverage any timing information. 
For Markov Chains based approaches tests were performed using the same 
synthetic data generated by the algorithm in Fig. 19 with the exception that all 
timing information (time stamp and TS values) was removed so that only 
sequences of destinations are left to be processed. Training and inference for 
these alternate approaches took place based on “observations”. Each 
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observation simulated a user web session worth of input and consisted of a 
predetermined number (50) of web sites visited.  
Simulation was performed by using input data that is as representative 
of real user network traffic as possible. The input to the HTM prototype has the 
following form:  Timestamp<TS, Dest>, where: (1) Generation of the 
Timestamp input field was accomplished by modeling devices entering 
(random distribution arrival times) and leaving (random distribution for service 
times) the network.  (2) Generation of the TCP TS value was accomplished by 
using a 50/50 ratio of TS values started at a fixed value (iphones) and random 
values (android phones). (3) Generation of destinations (ranked in order of 
popularity) visited by all users in the simulation follow a power law 
distribution (Zipf) . 
 
Figure 18 Synthetic Input Data for User Attribution Simulation 
 
Fig. 18 shows the input framework within which the simulation was 
run. A Java application was developed separate from the HTM, which 
produced, for each user, the synthetic input data as shown in Fig. 18. The data 
simulated devices associated with users entering the network at random times 
and initiating multiple communication sessions until the devices are turned off. 
Table 20 below shows the various random parameters that were used in the 
simulation. 
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Random 
Simulation 
Parameters 
Statistical 
Distributions 
Boundaries 
of Distributions 
Explanations 
Power On Time Random 
Uniform 
0 – 3 hours Simulates users powering on 
their devices and entering the 
network in the morning hours, 
between 6:00 AM and 9:00 AM 
Intra Session 
Time (IRA) 
Random 
Uniform 
0 – 5 
seconds 
Time between HTTP 
requests for a given user within the 
same user communication session. 
User communication sessions 
form clusters of web destinations 
visited by a user that follow each 
other close in time. 
Inter Session 
Time (IRT) 
Random 
Uniform 
1 – 5 
minutes 
Time between the end of a 
user communication session and 
the beginning of the next user 
communication session for that 
same user. 
Service Time Random 
Uniform 
Power Off 
Time  -  Power On 
Time 
Amount of time a device 
once powered on remains on in the 
network. 
Power Off Time Random 
Uniform 
0 – 21 hours Simulates time when users 
power off their devices and exit 
the network. 
Web Destinations Zipf 1 – 10,000 
web destinations 
Simulates web destinations 
ranked in order of importance (1 
most visited to 10000 as the least 
visited) visited by users. 
Number of Web 
Destinations per user 
session 
Random 
Uniform 
1- 10 
destination per 
session 
For each user session a user 
is allowed between 1 to 10 web 
visits chosen at random. 
TCP Timestamp 
(TS) 
Random 
Uniform 
0 - 232 50 % of devices entering the 
network will have a random 
starting value while the other 50% 
will have a fixed starting value of 
0. 
Table 20 Simulation Parameters 
The input generation application creates an input file for each 
simulated user where the numbers of train and test days are configurable 
parameters. 
The algorithm in Fig. 19 creates 5 simulation days’ worth of synthetic 
train data for user Ux. This simulation code generates synthetic data for 
training purposes for both HTM and alternate approaches. Each simulation day 
contains a random number of user sessions bounded by random intersession 
times. Each user session for the HTM is made up of a random number of input 
tokens of the form: Timestamp<TS, Dest>.  Within a user session, the intra 
session time randomly spaces occurrences of the input tokens.  Destinations are 
selected based on the Zipf distribution, with the most popular destinations 
having the highest probability of being selected over less popular destinations.  
The algorithm used to implement the zipf distribution is based on the zipf 
algorithm used in [20].  Next_ZipfRandom in Fig. 19 returns the next web site 
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in rank order from 1 to n (with 1 being the most visited and n the least) 
following a power law distribution. The algorithm generates web sites that are 
weight proportional to the Riemann zeta function:  
𝟏
𝟏
𝜽
+ 
𝟏
𝟐
𝜽
+….+ 
𝟏
 𝑵
𝜽
.  In the 
algorithm in [20], θ(theta) controls the skewness such that θ = 1.0 indicates the 
highest skew (all nodes have different popularity) and θ = 0 indicates the 
lowest skew (all nodes are equally popular). For this study, theta was set to 
0.96. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 High level algorithm to generate synthetic random train input for a single user 
 
Test data had to be created using a different approach since it had to be 
similar to the train data but also maintain a certain level of independence from 
train data. Three methods were used for generation of synthetic data for the test 
phase of experiments. All three algorithms (Random Walk, Walk Only and 
Concept Drift) walk a first order Markov chain of learned destinations which 
Ux_Max-Simulation_Days = 5        // Defines max number of Train or Test days  
 
// Create one input file per user Ux in simulation 
For Each user Ux in simulation Do  
- Generate_Input_For_User(Ux, Ux_Max_Simulation_Days) 
EnDo 
 
Generate_Input_For_User(Ux, Ux_Max_Simulation_Days) 
  TimeStamp   =  0 
  DevicePowerOnTime =  TimeStamp  + Uniform Random(0, 3Hrs) 
  DevicePowerOffTime =  DevicePowerOnTime      + Uniform Random(0, 21Hrs) 
  TS    =  Generate TCP TimeStamp-TS 
  TimeStamp  =   DevicePowerOnTime 
  While (Ux_Max_Simulation_Days   > 0 ) Do 
  While (TimeStamp  <  DevicePowerOffTime) Do 
 NumberDestinationsPerSessions =  Uniform Random(1,10) 
          While (NumberDestinationsPerSessions  >  0 AND TimeStamp  <      
      DevicePowerOffTime) Do 
Dest  =   Next_ZipfRandom (1000,theta)  // Get the next destination 
 Output TimeStamp<TS,Dest> to Ux file name 
 NumberDestinationsPerSessions = NumberDestinationsPerSessions – 1 
 IF (NumberDestinationsPerSessions > 0) THEN 
  IntraSessionTime-IRA =  UniformRandom(0,5secs) 
  TimeStamp     =  IntraSessionTime-IRA 
 TS                                  =               TS + IntraSessionTime 
 EndIF 
              EnDO 
     InterSessionTime-IRT =  UniformRandom(1,5mins) 
     TimeStamp  =  InterSessionTime-IRT 
               TS                                     =  TS  + InterSessionTime 
    EnDO 
    Ux_Max_Simulation_Days   =  Ux_Max_Simulation_Days   – 1 
    EnDO 
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were generated during the training phase of the synthetic data generation 
process. 
In the “Random Walk” the next destination Vj, for transitions of the 
form Vi   Vj, is chosen randomly in proportion to the in-degree of the node Vj. 
That is, in proportion to the access frequencies of the neighbors (Vj1,… Vjn) of 
the current node (Vi). If no such neighbor Vj exists then the walk proceeds with 
a new node Vi with at least one neighbor, selected from the learned destinations 
based on a zipf distribution. Selection of the next destination Vj  is based on the 
work of Price (1976) [39] who proposed a model of networks formation that 
gives rise to power-law degree distributions. Price was interested in the power 
law distribution of citation networks. Specifically, his model showed that a 
newly appearing paper cites previous ones chosen at random with a probability 
proportional to the number of citations that those previous papers already have. 
This property is critical in creating a relationship between train data generated 
for a given user with test data for that same user. While a relationship must 
exist between the train and test data sets it must also maintain a certain level of 
independence between the two sets which is provided by the randomness of the 
selection of already visited nodes. While the Price model has been applied to 
simulation of networks traversed by many users, in this study, this model is 
adjusted to simulate web visits by a single user. As a result the emphasis was 
not placed exclusively on in-degree or out-degree of network nodes but instead 
on the frequencies of edges emanating from or terminating to nodes 
representing web visits to web sites. The algorithm follows with connectivity 
probability  
1 -   
𝑶𝒊
𝑶𝒊+𝑪𝒊
   >  r  (0 ≤   r  ≤  1)  
a learned path proportional to the frequency of the in-degree of web sites along 
the path. Otherwise it starts a new path. In terms of notation, r is a random 
number that follows a uniform distribution,  Ci represents the sum of traversal 
frequencies of all edges emanating from Vi (Vi  Vj1-n) and  Oi  is the out 
degree of Vi. As would happen in real life the algorithm favors learned path 
patterns, but does also produce variations that simulate "concept drift”. In 
“Walk Only” -, the algorithm selects Vj randomly in proportion to access 
frequencies of all of Vi's neighbors as long as Vi  has at least one neighbor. 
Note that this algorithm minimizes any concept drift since it always follows a 
learned path as long as one exists, as opposed to the Random Walk algorithm 
that is constrained by the connectivity probability and the random value of r. In 
“Context Drift”, the algorithm selects Vj using the Walk Only algorithm except 
for 20% of the Vj destinations that are selected as new ones outside of the 
learned train set. In addition, 10% of the Vi  Vj transitions selected during the 
walk are new (not existing in the train set). 
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14.1. Evaluating similarity between Synthetic and Real Network data 
 In order to determine how similar train and test data sets are to each other, 
similarity statistics were computed against real cellular network data collected 
for an equivalent number of users. Observation similarity statistics between 
train and test data sets were generated based on all observations processed 
leveraging the work of Kumar and Raju [31]. 
 
(OSS)Observation Sequence Similarity              =           (21)                  
 
∑   
|𝐿𝐶𝑆(𝑇𝑂𝑖,   𝑇𝑟𝑂)|
|𝑇𝑂𝑖|
|𝑇𝑂|
𝑖=1
|𝑇𝑂|
⁄
 
(OSuS)Observation Substring Similarity  =            (22) 
               
∑   
|𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑢(𝑇𝑂𝑖,   𝑇𝑟𝑂)|
|𝑇𝑂𝑖|
|𝑇𝑂|
𝑖=1
|𝑇𝑂|
⁄
 
(OSeS)Observation Set Similarity                         =                        
            (23) 
 
∑   
|𝑇𝑂𝑖 ∩ 𝑇𝑟𝑂|
|𝑇𝑂𝑖|
|𝑇𝑂|
𝑖=1
|𝑇𝑂|
⁄
 
Overall Similarity                       =                                                                              (24) 
 
                           (.33)×OSS + (.33)×OSuS + (.33)×OSeS        
 
TO and TrO are the sets of all test and train observations respectively. TOi 
is a specific test observation from the test set TO. 𝐿𝐶𝑆(𝑇𝑂𝑖,   𝑇𝑟𝑂) is the length 
of the longest common subsequence match between a specific test observation 
and all train observations, whereas 𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑢(𝑇𝑂𝑖,   𝑇𝑟𝑂) is the length of the 
longest common substring match between a specific test observation and all 
train observations. As can be seen from Fig. 20 overall similarity between train 
and test synthetic data sets is 50%, with set similarity (observations in train and 
test data sets containing the same destinations but not in the same order) being 
as high as 83%. Sequence and substring similarity measure how alike 
sequences of destinations are between train and test data sets. The real network 
data measurements (line in red in Fig. 20) for an equivalent data set (5 users, 5 
train days, and 1 test days) collected from a real network show that train and 
test data sets are more similar to each other than similar data sets derived from 
synthetic data. These results provide support for the belief that synthetic data 
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represents a good benchmark for baselining the experiments conducted in this 
study.  
 
 
Figure 20 Similarities between Train and Test Data Sets 
 
 
 
 
15. Appendix G – Why use HTMs when dealing with Complex Networks? 
HTMs are unique in stressing the temporal aspect of perception and 
implementing memory for sequences of patterns that facilitate anticipation. 
Each level in the hierarchy is trained separately to memorize spatial-temporal 
objects (patterns) and is able to recognize objects in a bottom-up/top-down 
process [18].  The HTM hierarchy also enables efficient representation of 
relationships among many inputs by leveraging reuse of lower level inputs in 
order to represent higher level concepts at higher levels of the hierarchy. HTMs 
allow sequence learning (concatenation of spatial and then temporal learning), 
which provides the ability to make predictions and can be applied to 
disambiguate input. Only few methods exist that combine spatial and temporal 
learning in a tight way (e.g. recurrent neural networks can do this a well) [22]. 
 
Of specific interest to this study is the evaluation of the distribution of 
visitors to web sites. Adamic and Huberman [1] studied the distribution of 
users among web sites by examining usage logs from America Online covering 
120,000 sites. They discovered that the distribution of visitors per site follows a 
universal power law similar to that found by Pareto in income distributions. 
They reasoned that a small number of sites control the traffic of the web 
population, a result typical of winner-take-all markets. The authors agree that 
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the World Wide Web gives rise to an asymptotic self-similar structure in which 
there is no natural scale and the number of users per site is indeed distributed 
according to a power law. In another study, Adamic and Huberman [2] find 
inconsistencies in the conclusions of a study by Barabasi and Albert [5] which 
states that because of preferential treatment, a vertex that acquires more 
connections than another will increase its connectivity at a higher rate so that 
the connectivity between nodes increases in line with the growth of the 
network. This leads to older vertices increasing their connectivity at the 
expense of younger and leading to the well known “rich-get-richer” 
phenomenon for highly connected vertices.   Adamic and Huberman studied 
web crawls of 260,000 sites and concluded that all sites are not created equal 
since no correlation exists between the age of a site and its number of links. 
They explain that the rate of acquisition of new links varies from site to site 
and is probably proportional to the number of links the site already has, 
because the more links the site already has, the more visible it becomes and the 
more links it will get.   
While there has been agreement in the research community that 
communication traffic has self-similar characteristics, until recently it was 
believed that complex networks are not invariant or self-similar under large 
scale transformations. This belief is rooted in the small world property of these 
networks which would seem to imply that the number of nodes increases 
exponentially with the diameter of the network rather than following the power 
law relation expected for self-similar structures. Song, Havlin and Maske [44] 
analyzed real complex networks, like the web, utilizing a box counting method 
as a scale invariant renormalization procedure and concluded that, on the 
contrary, these networks consist of self-repeating patterns on all length scales 
that suggest they share common self-organizing properties. 
 What are the implications of addressing the user attribution problem in 
the context of complex networks?  The self-similar, small world and clustering 
properties together with the preferential attachment characteristic of complex 
networks supports the notion that users tend to visit a limited number of mostly 
popular sites with increasing frequencies. How can the approach implemented 
in this study leverage unique and personal patterns to differentiate among users 
if different users visit mostly the same sites and this research proposes to use 
web site visits as a way to uniquely recognize users? 
This study has leveraged the power law properties that characterize web 
traffic of users who visit different web sites. Specifically, the implications of 
the power law distribution support the notion that while it is true that few web 
sites get visited very often by all users, many web sites, in the long tail portion 
of the power law distribution, get visited less often by a variety of users as 
well. By recording communication patterns of past activity for each user it 
becomes possible to identify unique and differentiating elements that will 
enable isolation among users.  More specifically, the hypothesis in this study 
has been that the long tail properties of the distribution of user visits to web 
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sites together with the time order of such visits create conditions for unique 
differentiation among user patterns that allows to adequately address the user 
attribution problem. 
HTMs have been successfully used in classification problems in a 
variety of applications such as recognition of USPS handwritten digits [8], 
speech recognition [17], and prediction of user choices on mobile phones [34]. 
HTMs have also been used in the area of web analytics which represents an 
important use case for this study.  In a talk given for the association of 
computing machinery (ACM) in 2009, Subutal Ahmad, vice president of 
engineering at Numenta, described results of experiments using Numenta’s 
HTMs to predict user web click behavior for topics and pages of interest to the 
user. In these experiments web content was partitioned into 177 different 
topics. In their experiments random prediction reported 0.56% accuracy. By 
training the HTM with 100,000 user sequences (web pages) and using no 
temporal context (0
th
 order prediction based on recorded popularity of topics 
and web pages) the accuracy reported was 23%, which matches what most web 
sites can do today. By including in the analysis transition probabilities from a 
given web page to another in the form of 1
st
 order prediction, predictive 
accuracy increased to 28%.  By further leveraging use of variable order 
prediction, accuracy levels jumped to 45%. Variable order prediction, used in 
this study, allows prediction to fully leverage the dynamic “context” (different 
length sequences) of web pages visited by a user.   
 
 
16. Appendix H – Tables Describing Parameters for Experiments 
Table 21 . EXPERIMENT TYPE E1, USER ATTRIBUTION NO CONCEPT DRIFT 
Number of Web 
Destinations 
 Number of Users  
        5 20 50 100 500 
1000 5/1, 5/2, 3Obs  5/1, 5/2, 3Obs 5/1, 5/2, 3Obs 5/1, 3Obs 3Obs 
5000 5/1, 3Obs 5/1, 3Obs 5/1, 3Obs 5/1,3Obs 3Obs 
10,000 5/1, 3Obs 5/1, 3Obs 5/1, 3Obs 5/1,3Obs 3Obs 
 
 
 
Table 22 . EXPERIMENT TYPE E2, USER ATTRIBUTION WITH CONCEPT DRIFT 
Number 
of Users  
 Number Train Days/Number of Test Days 
 5/2  10/3 15/4 20/5 
5 Walk Only,  Walk Only Walk Only Walk Only 
5 Random Walk Random Walk Random Walk Random Walk 
5 Walk Only 20% Walk Only 20% Walk Only 20% Walk Only 20% 
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Number 
of Users  
 Number Train Days/Number of Test Days 
 5/2  10/3 15/4 20/5 
and10% and10% and10% and10% 
 
 
Table 23. EXPERIMENT TYPE E3, E10 USER ATTRIBUTION UNDER DOS ATTACK 
Number of 
Users/Numb
er infected 
users  
 DOS Attack Parameters 
 Number 
Destinations/Unit of 
Time, Repeats Every 
Number 
Destinations/Unit of 
Time, Repeats Every 
Number 
Destinations/Unit of 
Time, Repeats Every 
 
10/4 5/5ms, 5ms 10/10ms, 5ms 20/20ms, 5ms  
 
 
Table 24 . EXPERIMENT TYPE E4, E11 USER ATTRIBUTION UNDER PHISH ATTACK 
Number of 
Users/Number 
infected users 
 Phish Attack Parameters 
 Number 
Destinations/Unit of 
Time, Repeats 
Every 
Number 
Destinations/Unit of 
Time, Repeats Every 
Number 
Destinations/Unit of 
Time, Repeats Every 
 
10/4 1/1ms, (1min-1hour) 3/3ms, (1min-1hour) 5/5ms, (1min-1hour)  
 
 
 
 
Table 25. EXPERIMENT TYPES E7,E8, E9, USER ATTRIBUTION  
Number of Users   Number Train Days/Number of Test Days 
5 5/1 5/2 10/3  
10 5/1 5/2 10/3  
 
 
17. Appendix I - Glossary of HTM Abbreviations and Symbols 
The table below provides an explanation for many of the abbreviations, terms and 
symbols used in HTM computations and algorithms found in the “The Approach” 
section. 
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Table 26. TERMS USED IN HTM CALCULATIONS AND ALGORITHMS 
Terms Description 
ALLLS Adjusted Length LLS computes the appropriate proportion of 
an input string IS matched against the longest common 
subsequence LCS or longest common substring LCSu of a 
candidate learned longest common subsequence cLLS that 
needs to be accounted for during similarity calculations. 
Specifically, ALLLS returns the length of the input sequence IS 
matched against subsequence cLLS. This length, based on the 
ALLLS_Cond condition, is equal to the size of the input 
sequence when IS matches completely from the beginning 
sequence cLLS, otherwise the length returned is the size of the 
longer sequence between the IS and cLLS. Experiments 
conducted during this study have shown that matching 
substrings from the beginning of a best matching cLLS 
produces better recall accuracy results than matching 
substrings sequences in the middle of cLLS. 
ALLLS_Cond Adjusted Length LLS condition is true if the size of the input 
sequence IS matches completely from the beginning sequence 
cLLS. 
cLLS cLLS refers to a candidate longest learned sequence  LLS, one 
out possibly many that matches IS, out of all Markov chains in 
a given HTM layer. 
DM Degree of Membership finds the best (longest) match 
computed based on sequence similarity (SS) between a single 
input sequence IS and all cLSS sequences in a given HTM 
layer. See equation (8) 
𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊 Feed forward belief measures the degree of membership (DM) 
of a given input sequence at layer Lx-1 of the HTM computed 
against the most persistently visited LLS belonging to 
Temporal group gi at layer Lx-1. Each computed LLS can only 
belong to a unique Markov Chain within an HTM layer. See 
equation (9). 
FFB_PP Path Probability of LLS is the path probability algorithm 
which computes the path probability of matching the longest 
learned sequence (LLS) and then for each LLS mismatch 
against IS a penalty is computed. The algorithm ensures that 
path probability P(LLSk | LLSj)   (where LLSk follows directly 
LLSj ) is computed only if LLSk and LLSj  are both matched in 
IS otherwise penalties are computed (as shown in condition 
12.c of the path probability algorithm shown in  Fig. 17). See 
equation (10). 
Fq Frequency of visits is used to compute the persistence (PS) of 
a given cLLS sequence. 
gi A temporal group gi, also known as “coincidence”, is the 
Markov chain which holds the Longest Learned Sequence 
(LLS) 
IAL Input Activation Level represents the strength of the match of 
the input sequence against the longest learned sequence (LLS) 
from the HTM layer below Ln-1 and is used to normalize feed 
forward belief calculations at layer Ln. Examples of how feed 
forward beliefs propagate through HTM layers are shown in 
Appendix B. See equation (16) 
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𝛌𝑳𝒙<𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊 , 𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊+𝟏, > A vector of feed forward beliefs at HTM layers 1, 2, 3.  The 
topmost HTM layer is also known as “output” layer. See 
equation (15) for λL2 and equation (14) for λL3. 
λOutput<𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊, 𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊+𝟏, > A vector of feed forward beliefs at the output HTM layer. See 
equation (13) for λLoutput  
LCS Longest Common Subsequence is computed as the longest 
sequence of inputs (web destinations or temporal groups) that 
appears left to right but not necessarily in a contiguous block 
in both input sequence (IS) and the matched cLLS. 
LCSm Longest Common Subsequence Measure computes the portion 
of the cLLS matched as the longest common subsequence 
against the input sequence IS. See equation (1).  
LCSu Longest Common Substring is computed as the longest 
sequence of inputs (web destinations or temporal groups) that 
appears left to right in a contiguous block in both input 
sequence (IS) and matched cLLS. 
LCSUm Longest Common Substring Measure computes the portion of 
the cLLS matched as the longest common substring against the 
input sequence IS. See equation (2). 
LLS Longest Learned Sequence is the single longest sequence of 
learned inputs (web destinations or temporal groups) in a 
Markov chain within an HTM layer that best matches the input 
sequence. The LLS is discovered by computing the longest 
common subsequence and substring of learned sequences in 
the HTM (eq. 1,2). 
MAX_FFB_HTMs Max Feed Forward Belief for HTMs uses the  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐻𝑇𝑀1..𝑀  
function to compute the highest valued feed forward belief 
(based on one of 7 HTM algorithms) for a given observation 
worth of input for a given HTM/user (see equation 17). To 
review examples of calculations of feed forward beliefs 
propagating towards upper layers of the HTM during HTM 
training see Appendix A and during inference see Appendix B.  
Ps Persistence measures how often learned sequences in Markov 
chains are visited (see equation 4). For instance, consider the 
Markov chains at layer 1 of the HTM in Fig. 14 from 
Appendix B, which used the spatial pooler algorithm to 
combine groups of web destinations into sequences based on 
terminating conditions TC1-3. These Markov chains were 
created during the training phase using sequences of web sites 
as shown in Table 10 from Appendix A. All nodes in Fig. 14 
represent unique web destinations, with the exception of 
cloned nodes which are represented using prime symbols as in 
S3’ and S3’’.  Assume that cLLS = <S1, S2, S3 ,S4> then 
Fq(cLLS) = 1, NLS = 16 and Ps(cLLS) = 1/16. As another 
example, assume cLLS = <S1,S3,S6>  from Fig. 14, then 
Fq(cLLS) = 2,  NLS = 16 and  Ps(cLLS) = 2/16. 
 𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵(𝒈𝒊, 𝒈𝒊+𝟏,𝒈𝒊+𝟐,…) Sequence of temporal groups received from a lower HTM 
layer which represents an input sequence learned and inferred 
within variable order Markov chains at HTM layers 2 and 3 
𝑺𝛌𝐎𝐮𝐭𝐩𝐮𝐭𝒌..𝒌+𝑵(𝛌𝐎𝐮𝐭𝐩𝐮𝐭𝒌+𝑵) 
 
A sequence of feed forward beliefs received at Max Output 
layer from a given HTMi for a single observation worth of data 
and represents an input sequence (IS) received at the Max 
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Output layer.  
Sp Sequence persistence measures the persistence (frequency) of 
visits (Ps) to a given cLLS normalized using persistence 
weight WP. See equation (7). 
SS Sequence Similarity measures the similarity of an input 
sequence (IS) and cLLS  based on the aggregate of longest 
common subsequence (LCSm) and substring measures 
(LCSUm ) normalized with subsequence and substring weights 
(Ws,Wu). See equation (6). 
Timestamp<TS, Dest>   Represents HTM input at layer 1. Timestamp is the time in 
milliseconds when the input was received by the HTM.  TCP 
Timestamp (TS) is the time in milliseconds when a TCP packet 
was sent. Destination (Dest) is the destination address 
(represented within the HTM as a number) of the HTTP 
request received by the HTM. 
Ws Similarity weights represent the relative importance attributed 
to different components of the sequence similarity calculation. 
Ws represents the weight given to the longest common 
subsequence portion of the sequence similarity calculation. Wu 
represents the weight given to the longest common substring 
portion of the sequence similarity calculation. Wp represents 
the weight given to the sequence persistence calculation. The 
similarity weights values are based on results from 
experiments which have shown that sequence persistence (SP) 
which is simply based on frequency of occurrences of learned 
sequences, while necessary to improve overall accuracy 
results, has the least impact on overall recall accuracy in 
contrast to the sequence similarity calculation (SS) which 
instead is based on recognition of the timed order of web 
destinations within learned sequences.  
 
